Brazil-USA relations from Tiradentes to Barão do Rio Branco

Bruno Gonçalves Rossi
BRAZIL-USA RELATIONS FROM TIRADENTES TO BARÃO DO RIO BRANCO

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Abstract: The Baron of Rio Branco is popularly known as the greatest diplomat in Brazil's history. In the literature on Brazilian Foreign Policy, the Baron is seen (along with Joaquim Nabuco) as the founder of Americanism, a foreign policy paradigm in which bilateral relations with the United States were privileged within the Brazilian diplomatic agenda. This paradigm has been adopted with little opposition by the Foreign Ministry until the 1950s when it was gradually replaced by a globalist paradigm that defines the Brazilian foreign policy since. Without completely denying this now traditional perspective, this article makes a brief assessment of relations between Brazil and the United States in the 19th century, ie before the Baron became foreign minister of Brazil. What is observed is that Brazil and the United States had peaceful, although distant, relations during most of the 19th century. This scenario, however, went through significant changes at the end of the century. Thus, it is important to note that the Baron and Nabuco have not created a new paradigm without any precedent. The analysis provided here is intended to help better consider the role of the Baron and Nabuco in the history of Brazilian foreign policy, particularly in relations between Brazil and the United States.

Key words: Baron of Rio Branco; Joaquim Nabuco; Brazil-USA relations

RELACÕES BRASIL-ESTADOS UNIDOS DE TIRADENTES AO BARÃO DO RIO BRANCO

Resumo: O Barão de Rio Branco é reconhecidamente um dos maiores diplomatas da história do Brasil. Na literatura a respeito de Política Externa Brasileira, o Barão é visto (juntamente com Joaquim Nabuco) como o fundador do Americanismo, um paradigma de política externa no qual as relações bilaterais com os Estados Unidos foram privilegiadas dentro da agenda diplomática brasileira. Este paradigma foi adotado com pouca oposição pelo Itamaraty até a década de 1950, quando foi aos poucos substituído por um paradigma globalista, que define a política externa brasileira desde então. Sem negar completamente esta perspectiva já tradicional, o presente artigo faz uma breve avaliação das relações entre Brasil e Estados Unidos.
Unidos no século 19, ou seja, antes do Barão tornar-se ministro das relações exteriores do Brasil. O que se observa é que Brasil e Estados Unidos tiveram relações pacíficas durante a maior parte do século 19, ainda que distantes. Este quadro, porém, passou por significativas mudanças no final daquele século. Desta forma, é importante observar que o Barão e Nabuco não criaram um novo paradigma sem qualquer tipo de precedente. A análise oferecida aqui tem o objetivo de ajudar a considerar melhor o papel do Barão e de Nabuco na história da política externa brasileira, particularmente nas relações entre Brasil e Estados Unidos.

**Palavras-chave:** Barão do Rio Branco; Joaquim Nabuco; relações Brasil-Estados Unidos
José Maria Paranhos da Silva Júnior, the Baron of Rio Branco, is a highly praised figure in Brazilian hero’s pantheon. Name of streets, avenues and city squares all over Brazil, the Baron is also celebrated by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations as Brazil’s greatest diplomat in history, the man behind the “Rio Branco Institute”, center of formation for Brazilian diplomats, and even the “Rio Branco’s House”, name sometimes used for the ministry itself. Even if we choose to ignore the distinctions between the man and the myth, Rio Branco’s contributions to Brazilian foreign policy were indeed great: he consolidated Brazilian limits, affirmed the principle of judicial equality between nations, established the principle of non-intervention on neighboring countries, all that and more as it has been said “without making any injustice or shedding a drop of blood”. Most of all, the Baron was also responsible for consolidating the shift of Brazilian diplomatic axis from Europe (mainly England) to the United States, establishing a paradigm in Brazilian foreign policy often called Americanism. This paradigm persisted with little opposition until the early 1960s, when it was replaced by Globalism, to be briefly brought back from 1964 to 1967. Although Brazil does not officially hold to the same paradigm since then, Brazil-USA relations are still important to both sides. The USA is still Brazil’s major partner in several areas, and although this relation is not equally important for the USA, the tendency in Washington is to hold Brazil as an important partner, at least in Latin America (BUENO e CERVO, 2002).

The objective of this text is to help better consider the role of the Baron in the history of Brazilian foreign policy, particularly in relations between Brazil and the United States. Although this history is spread through several texts about Brazilian foreign policy, USA foreign policy, the Baron of Rio Branco and other themes, I don’t find recent academic articles that deal specifically with this. Some books have been published about this over time, some of the most important ones almost a century ago. I believe that Brazil-USA relations in the 19th century deserve new research and publications, and this article is a contribution to this effort. Other than that, this article was written having in mind that the Baron of Rio Branco was born in the 19th century (in 1845 to be precise), and was already a grown man when he became chancellor. So, he lived through most of the events I narrate here, and it is clear that he had then in mind when he took the decision of establishing Americanism as Brazil’s paradigm of foreign policy. In other words, to know more about Brazil-USA relations before Rio Branco may be to better understand Rio Branco’s policy towards the USA.

The Baron didn’t consolidate the shift of Brazilian diplomatic axis from Europe (mainly England) to the United States all by himself. A central part of this shift was to raise the diplomatic representation of Brazil in the United States to the level of embassy,
nominating the already famous Joaquim Nabuco to be Brazil’s first ambassador in Washington. As much as the Baron (or maybe even more), Nabuco was a defender of closer relations between Brazil and USA and deserves at least as much credit for the shift. Actually, Brazil had at that time a favorable scenario for the change operated by Nabuco and the Baron: the Republican regime established in 1889 was in great part modeled after the USA (certainly this can be said of the Republican Constitution of 1891, mostly written by Rui Barbosa with the American Constitution as a blueprint), and economic ties between the two countries were increasing since the late 1800s, especially with Brazil coffee exports to the USA. It can be said that the Baron just confirmed a tendency observed for some decades then.

Despite the somewhat negative observations in the paragraph above, the Baron of Rio Branco was indeed a great character in Brazilian history, especially its diplomatic history, and also to Brazil-USA relations. But it is important to notice that he didn’t start Brazil-USA relations ex nihilo in early 20th century. First, USA was the first country to recognize Brazil’s independence from Portugal (before Portugal itself or even England, a country that, compared to USA, would enjoy closer relations with Brazil in the first half of the 19th century), a fact that the Baron himself would highlight in his decision to bring the countries closer together. Second, although the two countries were somewhat mutually unimportant for most of the 19th century, Brazil and USA experienced mostly positive relations for almost 80 years before the Baron became Brazil’s chancellor. Third, as already noticed, this relation was changing from mild to more important before the Baron actually decided to make it central to Brazilian foreign policy.

The structure of the text is mainly chronological. I start with Brazil-USA relations when, to be completely strict, there was no Brazil as an independent and sovereign state, and from there I move through the 19th century, highlighting some of the most important themes in the countries’ bilateral relations. Naturally, dealing with a long period of time, because of space restrictions not all events can be approached with due depth, and it is possible that events considered relevant by some are forgotten. Anyway, I hope the text will allow a sufficient understanding of the fundamental: the Baron did not establish his Americanism in a vacuum. Although Brazil and the United States were not particularly close during the 19th century, their relations served as a backdrop to the paradigm that was established in the early 20th century. Although some primary sources are used, I also want to make some of the secondary sources concerning this theme better known, so they are cited in the text.

Hopefully, this article will help researchers and students of Brazilian foreign policy, USA foreign policy, Brazil-USA relations and others to have a better understanding of several
themes and also to start from here to develop deeper researches on the several themes I introduce.

Brazil-USA relations from 1789 to 1822: Washington, Rio de Janeiro, and the other independences

Brazil-USA relations start even before Brazil was formally an independent country. One example of this is the influence of American ideas in the Conjuração Mineira of 1789. There is even evidence that some of the rebels in Minas Gerais tried to obtain support from Thomas Jefferson. Anyway, it is clear that liberals in late 18th century Brazil had access to American writing, such as the Federalist Papers and even the Constitution itself, already translated into Portuguese in 1789. Although the movement in Minas Gerais was defeated by the Portuguese Crown, American ideological influence in Brazil was not over by then (BANDEIRA, 1978; HILL, 1932; BURNS, 2003: 58).

Although Brazilian independence is officially dated to September 7, 1822, it can be said that the actual independence was an ongoing process started in 1808 and was consolidated in 1840 (BARMAN, 1998:205-212; EAKIN, 2007:217; EAKIN, 1998:37). Moreover, the independence proclaimed in 1822 was only one project of emancipation among others. D. Pedro I was connected to a group of emancipationists concentrated in Rio de Janeiro. Meanwhile, other independence projects were under way in the country, with emphasis on a movement in Pernambuco, in the northeast (MELLO, 2004).

The first step in the process of independence led by Rio de Janeiro was the Portuguese royal family move from Lisbon to that city. Instead ofcondemning this move as an unwanted European and monarchical interference in the continent, Jefferson took a more practical approach and welcomed Dom João to the Americas. Henry Hill, sent by Jefferson to Rio de Janeiro, was the first American diplomat to Latin America. With the Portuguese capital move to Brazil, the president expected that a partner state would eventually emerge in the Hemisphere. Dom João was also cordial towards the Americans, as much as he was to the English, granting them several prerogatives on Brazilian soil (FONTAINE, 1974:10-11; HILL, 1932: 3-4).

Brazil was elevated to the status of United Kingdom with Portugal and Algarves in 1815, Dom João was called back to Lisbon by the Portuguese Cortes, and finally Brazil independence was proclaimed by his son Dom Pedro I, in 1822. Meanwhile, American presidents followed Jefferson’s steps. James Madison sent Thomas Sumter Jr. as new minister
to Rio de Janeiro, and despite losses when compared to the English, American trade with Brazil grew steadily from 1808 to 1811 (HILL, 1932:6). James Monroe didn’t answer the cry for help from the republican movement in Pernambuco, in 1817, a gesture that would be repeated in 1824 in relation to the Confederation of the Equator (MELLO, 2004:223-224). Instead, he chose to keep the good relations with the Portuguese court in Rio, and finally was the first head of state to recognize Brazilian independence from Portugal, in 1824, majorly continuing the relations already established with Dom João and then Dom Pedro I.

Despite the overall auspicious beginning, Brazil-USA relations in this period were not without misunderstanding. Portugal was neutral during the War of 1812, and similarly, USA was neutral towards the Pernambucan revolt in 1817, even though the rebels tried to obtain support from Washington. In both cases, mere neutrality was not what both parts expected from the perceived partners (HILL, 1932:10-25). Thomas Sumter Jr. was able to increase trade between Brazil and USA, but he was also unable to adapt to the customs of a monarchical European court, establishing a precedent that many American diplomats in Rio would follow (HILL, 1932:7, 94, 96). At times Condy Raguet (1825-1828), Henry A. Wise (1844-1847) and James Watson Webb (1861-1869) were not very diplomatic in their dealings with Brazilian authorities and the Brazilian public in general. It seems like sometimes Washington preferred to send the best diplomats to Europe, and left for Brazil people without the same formation. On the other hand, Brazil treatment towards the USA was not very different from that (BURNS, 2003:58-59). Finally, despite obvious gains on trade, American diplomacy felt postponed by Brazilians, who favored England in their trade agreements, something that ministers in Rio tried to reverse, but mostly to no avail (HILL, 1932:5, 105-109; FONTAINE, 1974:9-10).

**Brazil-USA relations in the First Reign: from an auspicious beginning to confusion and misunderstanding**

As mentioned before, following Jefferson’s steps when he welcomed Dom João to the Americas, James Monroe was the first head of state to recognize Brazilian independence after the Cry of Ipiranga, in 1822. Listening to John Quincy Adams’ advice, Monroe was being practical: he could choose a more strict interpretation of his own diplomatic doctrine, announced in 1823, and oppose a monarchical regime in the continent, ruled by the Portuguese-born Dom Pedro I. Instead, he welcomed the new addition to the American international system. Adams was hopeful that at some point Brazil would become a republic,
and anyway, without Portuguese intervention, Brazilian trade was welcomed by USA (FONTAINE, 1974:11). On its part, Brazil was the only Latin American country to recognize the Monroe Doctrine, and even to propose a military alliance with USA (FONTAINE, 1974:12). But the transition from Dom João to Dom Pedro I was not plentifully smooth for Brazil-USA relations: some people in Brazilian elite were unenthusiastic about American recognition of Brazil's independence. They believed that recognition from a republican, moreover what they viewed as a young and unimportant republic as the USA, meant little for Brazil (HILL, 1932:30), and despite Monroe’s and Adams’ initial gesture, the difference of political regime between the two countries would again be reason for animosity in the years to come (HILL, 1932:91-93, 96, 100). Overall, Brazil-USA relations in the next five decades were not a reason for great celebration on either side (SMITH, 1991:3-5; SMITH, 2010:13; HILL, 1932:73).

As mentioned before, Brazilian independence did not happen abruptly in 1822. The independence process started with Dom João move to Brazil, in 1808, continued with the elevation of the country to United Kingdom with Portugal in 1815, had a new and important step with the Cry of Ipiranga, in 1822, and continued during Dom Pedro I’s reign, from 1822 to 1831. In this period American diplomacy was still trying to beat the English in trade with Brazil (HILL, 1932:33), but some deeper grievances started to appear between the North and South American countries. Condy Raguet, the new Washington’s envoy to Brazil, constantly complained to his superiors in the USA about the harsh conditions of customs in Rio. But even worse in Raguet’s view were the consequences of the Cisplatine War to the USA. During the conflict Brazilian ships blocked the Plata river, regularly stopping and boarding American ships for search. The diplomat was distressed with the treatment to American sailors and ships up to the point threatening the Brazilians (who he considered an uncivilized people) with war. Dom Pedro I personally intervened in the situation and John Quincy Adams reproved the behavior of his envoy and replaced him for William Tudor, who was later praised by Adams for his successes in increasing bilateral trade. Nevertheless, things were also changing in the USA: unlike Jefferson, Madison and Monroe, Adams was succeeded by a rival, Andrew Jackson. Jackson didn't follow Tudor's advice, and recognized the government of Dom Miguel, Dom Pedro I's rival, in Portugal. This gesture, along with the Cisplatine incidents, strained bilateral relations in the years to come (HILL, 1932:39-56, 63-73).
Brazil-USA relations in the early Second Reign: American Civil War, Confederate Immigration, steamships and opening Brazilian rivers to world trade

Brazil’s independence process was consolidated in 1840. Following several political difficulties and answering to problems in Portugal, Dom Pedro I left Brazil in 1831. What followed was a decade of regencies, although Dom Pedro II, Dom Pedro I’s son and heir apparent, was expected to be crowned when reaching adulthood. That was anticipated in 1840 when Dom Pedro II was 14 years old, and so Brazil had a Brazilian-born monarch who would reign until been overthrown by a military coup, in 1889. Moreover, even by North-American standards, his reign was mostly a period of stability in several senses. Brazil-USA relations, on the other hands, were lukewarm for about half of this time. A sad exception to this was that, while England pressured Brazil for the end of the slave trade, a great number of the Africans arriving in Brazil came in American ships. While some of the American ministers in Rio warned their superiors about this (we can mention George H. Proffit, Henry A. Wise, David Tod and Robert C. Schenck), there was little to no action in Washington to stop this practice, something explained by the distance between Brazil (and the practical difficulties related to this), but also by the dispute between USA and England over leadership in Latin America (HILL, 1932:110-136, 143-144).

During the Civil War (1861-1865), Brazil-USA relations were difficult. Similarly to what happened before, during the Pernambuco Revolt of 1817 or the Cisplatine War, in the 1860s Brazil granted the Confederate States the status of belligerents and remained neutral towards the conflict in North America. In very practical terms, this meant that Confederate ships could use Brazilian ports as part of their strategy, much to the discontent of Lincoln. Closer to the end of the war Brazil decided in favor of the Washington government, but the relations between the two countries had already suffered some damage by then (BURNS, 2003:59; HILL, 1932:152-153, 158-159; FONTAINE, 1974:13).

The USA emerged from the Civil War as a more united country, and also with a more powerful executive and an economy in rapid expansion. Initially, the country was unwilling to pursue a more participative role in world affairs. Albeit slowly, but surely, this started to change as well. In this process, Brazil-USA relations also started to change. Some of the confederate veterans (unsatisfied with the defeat) decided to move to Brazil. That excited Brazilian elites, who were in search of workforce to replace the Africans, since slavery was in process of abolition, especially since the end of the slave traffic in 1850 (BURNS, 2003:59).
The more excited Brazilians and Americans expected that hundreds of thousands of veterans with their families would move to Brazil. Some Brazilians were concerned that the Americans would be more conscious of their rights as immigrants, and would make tougher demands than the Germans who came in previous decades. Others (especially liberals) believed that the Americans would bring progress with them. Anyway, the general opinion was that the confederate immigration would not pass unnoticed (VIEIRA, 1980:216-217). The liberals welcomed the confederates enthusiastically and even created immigration societies to help. The Brazilian government was in general welcoming as well, trying to facilitate the immigration process, even with easy land and money access. There was especially an expectation that the former combatants could join the Brazilian forces in the Paraguayan War, bringing their military experience with them (HILL, 1932:241-243).

The reality was very far from the expectations. Only about 8 to 10 thousand former confederates moved to various parts of Latin America, and just a few of these eventually arrived in Brazil. A small number came really fast, looking for a fresh start after the war. Others were more cautious, and first arranged their own migration societies (HILL, 1932:239). Of these, most were concentrated in few colonies, especially in western São Paulo, instead of spreading through the country as Brazilian elites would have it (HILL, 1932:243-244). Concerning the Paraguayan War, Brazilian expectations were completely frustrated: war weary, the veterans of the Civil War would have no business in a new conflict in South America (HILL, 1932:257-258).

The confederate exile to Brazil intensified contacts between the two countries for a while, but with little lasting results. Some considerations can be done about it: first, just a small number of confederates actually made it to Brazil. Washington would not help them (as it might be expected, concerning former enemies of the Northern government), and despite all the help offered by the Brazilian government, the veterans of the Civil War never seemed as enthusiastic about it as the Brazilians, especially Brazilian liberals (HILL, 1932:255-257). Second, there is some irony to the fact that the veterans chose Brazil of all countries as a site for immigration. Considering they fought a war for slavery back in North America, Brazil with slavery still in place could at first seem to be a good choice, but on hindsight, the abolition process in Brazil was inevitable (even if handled very carefully by authorities). Other than that, former slaves in Brazil were not legally differentiated by their skin color and had even more rights than white foreigners. The confederates, on their part, never applied for Brazilian citizenship, although that was not bureaucratically a difficult matter. It seems that, although living in Brazil, they never fully desired cutting ties with their motherland (HILL,
1932:257-258). Nevertheless, the confederates contributed to the development of some Brazilian cities, especially in the province of São Paulo, including Americana and Santa Bárbara do Oeste (HILL, 1932: 252-255). In addition, the confederates also contributed to the growth of Protestantism in Brazil (FERREIRA, 1992: 247-248, MATOS, 2004: 13-14).

During the Civil War, USA was represented in Brazil by James Watson Webb (1861-1869). Born in New York and without prior diplomatic experience, it seems that Webb was chosen for the task at least in part because of his political connections to other New Yorker, the secretary of state William H. Seward (HILL, 1932:147). Although his permanence in Brazil was long when compared to other diplomats in the 19th century, Webb’s diplomacy was not particularly successful in developing Brazil-USA relations. Among his proposals was creating a colony for freed slaves in the Brazilian Amazon and buying the French Guyana. Webb's ideas were mostly not welcomed in the USA, not even by Seward, but on the other hand, they sometimes frightened Brazilians who were already afraid of an American intervention in the Amazon (HILL, 1932:159-162, 174-176).

Another project Webb tried to convey was the establishment of a steamboat line connecting Brazil and USA. Such lines were already established between Brazil and England, and so it seemed just natural for Americans to do the same, and to avoid losing political and economic influence over Brazil to the Europeans (HILL, 1932:163). Although this project was welcomed in Washington, he had competition, especially from Thomas Rainey, a businessman also interested in connecting Brazil and USA by the steam engine. Webb wanted his son (or even himself) to own any steamboat line between the two countries, a detail he tried to hide from Lincoln. Meanwhile, he expected that Seward would favor him in the Congress (HILL, 1932:165-166). Webb’s schemes delayed the project as they raised suspicions both in Brazil and USA, but in 1865 a steamboat line was eventually established connecting the two countries, something that helped to bring them closer together. Webb’s company was not chosen, and he abandoned the idea considering that his country was unthankful for all his services (HILL, 1932:168-171).

Shortly after the Civil War was over, another major event happened in Brazil-USA relations: the opening of the Amazon River to international navigation and trade. American interest about the Amazon can be dated back to the early 1850s, with The Amazon, and the Atlantic Slopes of South America a publication by navy officer Matthew Fontaine Maury. In it, Maury reported that due to sea currents, the Amazon was a continuation of the Mississippi and that opening it to navigation and trade would benefit New Orleans, Louisiana and finally the entire USA. William L. Herndon, cousin of Maury (and also an officer in the American
Navy), would guide an expedition on the Amazon from the Andes with Lardner Gibbon (yet another American Navy officer) in 1851. The result of this expedition was a report delivered to the Congress in 1853 and published by presidential order from Franklin Pierce in 1854 as *Exploration of the Valley of the Amazon* (HERNDON & GIBBON, 1854).

News about American expeditions on the Amazon were not welcome in Rio de Janeiro. It should be noticed that by this time the USA was forcibly opening Japan to international trade, that the Mexican-American War was still a very recent event and that the 1850s was a decade of famous filibuster expeditions in Central America, if not with support, at least with connivance by Franklin Pierce (MCPHERSON, 1988: 112). William Trousdale, American minister in Rio, arrived in the city in 1853 with explicit orders to obtain with Brazil a treaty of free navigation on the Amazon. On the other hand, Francisco Ignácio de Carvalho Moreira, Brazilian envoy to Washington, talked with secretary of state William Learned Marcy on more than one occasion about his concerns about American expeditions on the Amazon. Marcy tried to calm Moreira, but the atmosphere in Rio was still tense (HILL, 1932:226).

José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco, Brazilian minister of foreign relations (1855-1857, 1858-1859, 1861) was cautious or even unwilling to open the river, as was the emperor himself (Pedro II, 1956:75). Paranhos resisted Trousdale as well as Richard K. Meade and James Watson Webb on this matter (HILL, 1932:159-162, 229-234). On the other hand, liberal congressman Aureliano Candido Tavares Bastos was very much in favor of it and defended the idea in several publications in Brazil and USA during the 1860s (HILL, 1932:235-236). Bastos was helped by some Americans, of which we can highlight James Cooley Fletcher, author of *Brazil and the Brazilians: portrayed in historical and descriptive sketches* (1857). Fletcher was in Rio as a missionary from 1852 to 1854 and again in 1855 (he would return in other occasions) and raised the issue of the opening of the Amazon River to international navigation through articles about the issue through local newspapers in Rio de Janeiro (VIEIRA, 1980:95). Although his opinions were very different from Maury’s, Herndon’s and Gibbon’s in important aspects, he also considered that the opening of the river to international trading and navigation would be an unparalleled event for the international trade (KIDDER e FLETCHER, 1857:570). At the same time, he evaluated that, though scientifically accurate, Maury’s propositions regarding the Amazon and its navigation had hindered the approach between Brazil and United States. According to the Missionary, since Maury’s work was published, it has had been impossible to negotiate a
treaty with Brazil, a country with which the US had extreme necessity of establishing closer relations (KIDDER e FLETCHER, 1866:578-580).

American interest in the Amazon was dormant for a while but returned after the Civil War and with the Confederates’ immigration to Brazil (HILL, 1932:214-218). Up to that time, American diplomacy was successful in establishing treaties with Peru, but Brazil answered these with treaties with Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and New Granada. Eventually, the Americans realized that a successful treaty was impossible without Brazil, a country that had not only the mouth of the river but also most of its extension (HILL, 1932:223-225).

In 1865, when chances of opening the river seemed minimal, a new event precipitated changes: Swiss-American biologist and geologist Jean Louis Rodolphe Agassiz, professor at Harvard, led the Thayer Expedition to the Amazon (RIBEIRO, 1987:9). Agassiz had an old interest in Brazilian fish - he even published a book about it in 1829 (SPIX; AGASSIZ; MARTIUS, 1829) - and this interest was renewed by James Cooley Fletcher. When Fletcher returned to the USA from Brazil in 1856, he sought to become a link between the Emperor Dom Pedro II and some American sages, among who was Agassiz. The result was a long lasting friendship between the Emperor and his “friends from New England” (VIEIRA, 1980:73; JAMES, 1952). Between 1862 and 1863, Fletcher was again in Brazil, this time as an agent of the American Sunday School Union. In this period, upon Professor Louis Agassiz’s request, he sailed almost two thousand miles through the Amazon River collecting specimens for ichthyological studies (VIEIRA, 1980:97. RIBEIRO, 1981:128; RIBEIRO, 1987:9; FERREIRA, 1992:78-79). In 1865, the Missionary was back to Brazil to have Professor Agassiz in Rio.

On May 28, a dinner was organized to celebrate the Scientist’s birthday, with the presence of Fletcher and other missionaries. According to the Historian David Gueiros, Fletcher’s involvement with Agassiz’s scientific expedition was such that, judging by the available documentation, “it seemed to his Brazilian friends that such an expedition was of his own making” (VIEIRA, 1980:76-78). Fletcher was quick in dismantling overstatements about his role on Agassiz’s visit to Brazil—the Diário do Rio de Janeiro even published the news that he was in Rio to introduce the scientist, what he denied in correspondence with the Emperor, declaring that Agassiz needed no introduction (JAMES, 1952:70-71). Even though, of course, the missionary used the Thayer Expedition and Agassiz’s prestige to promote several projects that for years he had defended in the United States and in Brazil—the emancipation of slaves, the opening of the Amazon to international navigation, the International Immigration Society, and the New York-Rio de Janeiro steamship line. The
Emperor himself offered personal help for the Thayer Expedition, and returning home in August 1866, Agassiz wrote an account of this expedition, entitled *A Journey in Brazil*, published in 1868. On December 7, 1866, just five months after the Expedition, the River was opened for navigation and trade (HILL, 1932:236-238. FONTAINE, 1974:13-14).

When the Civil War was not yet finished a new conflict began in the Americas, this time in the South and involving Brazil: the Paraguayan War (1864-1870). It also had impacts on Brazil-USA relations (HILL, 1932:177). James Watson Webb, the belligerent diplomat aforementioned, wanted to mediate the conflict, although initially, this was unauthorized by Washington. Eventually, Webb received authorization from the American government and the mediation was accepted by Paraguay, but declined by Brazil. Webb interpreted - correctly according to modern researchers (DORATIOTO, 2002) - that Brazil wanted nothing but complete victory because it feared for the future of the monarchy in case of another scenario (HILL, 1932:195-196). Webb was also not in favor of Paraguay: he and Charles A. Washburn, American minister to Asunción, had difficult times with the Paraguayan dictator Francisco Solano López. Anyway, that did not stop Webb from pressing the Brazilian government for reparations to American citizens who suffered losses during the war (HILL, 1932:197-206). In short, during the Paraguayan War, Webb’s diplomacy was of no help for Brazil-USA relations (HILL, 1932:213).

Brazil-USA relations in the late Second Reign: the Emperor's visit to the USA, changes in US foreign policy and general rapprochement

Summarizing what we saw so far, it is fair to say that Brazil-USA relations from the 1820s up to the early 1870s was not a very close one. It is only in the mid-1870s that this picture started to change. An important moment to precipitate this was Dom Pedro II's visit to the USA in 1876, for the celebration of the independence centennial. Although Brazil was still diplomatically closer to England and USA was busier occupying the west, reconstructing the South and developing its industry, the presence of Dom Pedro II in American soil helped to readjust the picture Americans had of Brazil. The Emperor was initially received coldly, but soon the American public became impressed by his intelligence, culture and overall manners. The positive view of the Emperor resulted in a more positive view of his country, paving the way for more friendly relations in the years to come (BURNS, 2003:59-60. CARVALHO, 2007:157-170). Other factors helped in this as well: the connection between Rio and New York by steamboat and communications by telegraph among them (HILL, 1932:260-262).
Closer to the end of the 19th century, American diplomacy in general also went through a series of changes that would eventually remove it from the classic unilateralism of the founding fathers to a multilateralism especially associated with Woodrow Wilson. These changes would also eventually impact on relations between Brazil and the United States. An important part of these changes, especially concerning Latin America, happened in James Garfield’s presidency (1881), more specifically with James G. Blaine as his secretary of state (BEISNER, 1986). Blaine tried to put in practice a pan-Americanism that he entertained already for years (Blaine and Pan Americanism, 1880s/1890s, in http://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/Blaine. Access on January 28, 2013). Among his policies were trying to secure the monopoly of a canal in Central America, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans (something that would only be actually implemented later, with the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901) and offering help (although declined) to mediate the Pacific War of 1879-1883. But most of all, Blaine wanted the USA to host a Pan-American Conference to settle all these and other issues. Garfield was assassinated soon after his inauguration, and his successor vice-president Chester Arthur was not as supportive of Blaine’s projects. Blaine resigned soon after.

When Benjamin Harrison succeeded Grover Cleveland to the presidency, James G. Blaine could resume his job as secretary of state, and in 1889 he finally hosted the Pan-American Conference he dreamed of for so long. Blaine’s most advanced aim was to create a free trade area encompassing the whole continent. The next best thing would be to establish several individual trade agreements of some sort. He also wanted to reduce European influence on the Hemisphere. Despite Blaine’s intense campaign not only with Latin America, but also with Canada and the Caribbean, American jingoism, even from former days, raised suspicion in Latin America, and despite his best intentions Blaine’s greatest victory was to strengthen ties with specific countries in specific issues, but without the all-encompassing treaty he expected. For reasons not so clear Blaine pulled away again the secretary of state, and passed away not long after, in 1893 (http://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898 Access on March 7, 2013).

Grover Cleveland returned to the White House after Benjamin Harrison, and this presidency foreign policy towards Latin America was faced with the border dispute between England (in English Guyana) and Venezuela, between 1895 and 1899. Strictly speaking, the beginning of this dispute dates from 1814, when Britain acquired British Guiana (now Guyana) from the Netherlands. The treaty of ownership transfer did not provide for a western border to the region, and so, in 1835, Britain established this in the Schomburgk Line, which
increased the territory of Guyana at the expense of Venezuela (MOREIRA, et al, 2010:112-114). In 1841 Venezuela officially questioned the border declared by England, complaining that its eastern border would be on the Essequibo River, a claim that would withdraw from Guyana two-thirds of its territory. With the discovery of gold in the area in dispute, Britain sought to establish the border further west of Schomburgk Line. In 1876 Venezuela protested, broke off diplomatic relations with Britain, and called for assistance from the US, citing the Monroe Doctrine. For nineteen years Venezuela called for US support, without success. However, in 1895, Richard Olney, Cleveland’s Secretary of State in his second term, invoked the Monroe Doctrine to demand Britain to submit the matter to US will. The English response was that the Monroe Doctrine had no validity as international law. Nevertheless, Cleveland and Congress created a commission to resolve the border issue “by any means”. Rumors of war between the US and England began to circulate in the American press.

This border dispute between Venezuela and England, and the US role in the case, served as a backdrop for the emergence of the Olney Doctrine, Richard Olney’s interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine: the US assumed the role of great power, and especially the prerogative over the Western hemisphere (MOREIRA, et al, 2010:113). Pressured by the Boer War in South Africa and the administration of a vast colonial empire, Britain preferred to avoid conflict and to refer the border dispute to the American will. The news was received with enthusiasm in Venezuela, sure of a favorable decision. However, when the commission appointed by the US completed its work in 1899, the border was established on the same Schomburgk Line that for almost a century had been questioned by both parts. In other words, the US decision did not benefit England’s or Venezuela’s complaints (MOREIRA, et al, 2010:114).

William McKinley, Cleveland’s successor in the American presidency, strengthened American hegemony in the continent. In this respect, his government was marked mainly by the Spanish-American War (1898), a turning point in the US role in the international system. For the first time, the country faced alone a European rival in a war and emerged victoriously. More than that, the war was an example of the changes that were processed in relations between the US and Latin America. The US victory guaranteed the independence of Cuba (up to that point still a Spanish colony) and also forced Spain to cede Guam, Puerto Rico and the Philippines to the United States. Five years later, the United States also obtained a perpetual lease for a naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. At the same time, Hawaii was also annexed by the US. With all that, the US secured its role as a power in the Pacific, and also reaffirmed the role that had been building in America, defeating a European country with colonial claims.
on the continent. Unfortunately, by doing that, USA became very close to a colonial power itself (MOREIRA, et al, 2010:117-119).

The departure of James Watson Webb from Brazil, in 1869, marks a turning point in relations between the two countries. The incidents that often hindered the conviviality of the two nations have become almost absent in the years that followed. The reason for this change may be linked to a closer contact between the Secretary of State and its agents in Brazil, partly due to improved communications between Rio de Janeiro and Washington, and partly due to a greater interest in Latin America. Nevertheless, the reasons behind the US policy towards Brazil remained the same: to promote American interests against the Old Continent’s ones in the Western Hemisphere, including the challenge of replacing England in the Brazilian foreign trade agenda (HILL, 1932:259).

Webb was replaced by Henry T. Blow (1869-1870). Immediately upon assuming his post, Blow could see the lack of interest with which the Americans were seen by Brazilians. When asking Brazilian officials about why the admiration of previous decades had become cold, he received the answer that Webb was responsible for the new state of affairs. As a result of his performance during the War of Paraguay, and in the negotiations after the conflict, the feeling that the United States preferred to relate to republics and despised the monarchical Brazil had been awakened again among Brazilians. For his part, Blow tried to reverse the situation left by his predecessor, and the same can be said of his successors. Despite the difficulties of earlier times, the years immediately preceding the proclamation of the republic were marked by a growing climate of cordiality between the two countries. In 1871 the United States and England asked D. Pedro II to indicate a Brazilian arbitrator to join the arbitral tribunal in the case of Alabama between those two countries (HILL, 1932:260). Similarly, in 1880 Brazil arbitrated pending claims between the US and France (HILL, 1932:262). In addition, the growing export of Brazilian coffee to the United States favored the rapprochement between the two countries, although the valorization policy practiced later by the republican governments would be controversial in diplomatic terms (HILL, 1932:297-300; SMITH, 1991, 6, 19, 32-37, 46-47, 153, 30-32, 46, 76, 95; SMITH, 2010:7, 9, 24, 58, 76).

In sum, although the “traditional friendship” between the two countries is a characteristic of Brazilian republican period, certainly it can be said that the roots of this relationship were already established in the monarchy (HILL, 1932:259-260).
Brazil-USA relations in the early republic: Republicanism and Americanism

It was amid this international context that the Republic was proclaimed in Brazil by a military coup on November 15, 1889. The sudden proclamation of the Republic in Brazil led to a peculiar (and even embarrassing) situation to the Brazilian delegation sent by the monarchical government to the Pan-American Conference in Washington. Lafaiete Rodrigues Pereira, the leader of the delegation (a monarchist) resigned from office and the following year the Republican Salvador de Menezes Drummond Furtado de Mendonça, assumed the leadership of it (SMITH, 1991:9, 11).

Salvador de Mendonça was a pioneer of the Brazilian republican movement started in the 1870s, and, besides a diplomat, was a journalist, lawyer, novelist, essayist, poet, playwright and translator. He was also one of the founders of the Brazilian Academy of Letters. Mendonça was born in Itaboraí, state of Rio de Janeiro, in 1841. In 1859 he moved to São Paulo to study at the Law School there. The following year he founded a newspaper with Teófilo Ottoni Filho, another republican. In the same year, he returned to Rio as a journalist, working for Saldanha Marinho, yet another republican. In 1865 he became a teacher at the Pedro II School. In 1867 he went back to São Paulo to finish his Law studies. In the following years, he was divided between journalism, in favor of republicanism, and Law. Finally, in 1870, he founded the Republican Club with several of his companions and was the writer of part of the republican manifest of the same year. He also continued working as a journalist, this time more openly advocating the republican regime.

Despite the Republican propaganda, in 1875 Mendonça was appointed private consul of the Empire in Baltimore, and soon after was appointed to the consulate in New York. On May 3, 1876, he was promoted to Consul General of Brazil in the United States. On July 6, 1889, he was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on special mission in the United States and delegate of Brazil to the 1st International Conference of American States. He was in this position, along with Lafaiete Rodrigues Pereira, when the Republic was proclaimed in Brazil. While Lafaiete Rodrigues resigned from office, Mendonça took the defense of the regime implemented by Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca in Brazil. As it had occurred some 60 years earlier with James Monroe, Benjamin Harrison hesitated for a while to recognize the new regime in Brazil (SMITH, 1991:9-10). Ironically, this reservation was in part based on a genuine admiration for Dom Pedro II in the US, but thanks to the efforts of

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Mendonça, recognition by the United States came quickly, and with it recognition by the other republics of the continent (SMITH, 1991:12-13).

Although Mendonça asked to be dismissed off the office of Consul General of Brazil in New York on April 12, 1890, his work as a minister in special mission was maintained. Quintino Bocaiúva, another old republican, was named the first chancellor of the republic. Mendonça received from Bocaiúva the instructions to follow an “American spirit” in the negotiations at the Conference. This American spirit had been defined by Bocaiúva many years earlier in his manifesto of the Brazilian Republican Party: "we are in America and we want to be American" (BOCAIUVA, 1986). That is to say: in the vocabulary of Bocaiúva, the words American and Republican were confused. His understanding was that being a monarchy, Brazil was an aberration in the New World. At the same time, he understood that a change of regime, from monarchy to republic, would imply an automatic cordiality between Brazil and the other countries of the continent. A central example of this was the signing of the Treaty of Montevideo on January 25, 1890. By this treaty, Brazil and Argentina agreed with the splitting of the disputed territory of Palmas. Although defended by the chancellor, this solution to the border dispute underwent profound opposition and was not approved by Congress in Brazil (BUENO e CERVO 2002:167). Another example of this republican approach was the attempt of the French Republic to subordinate diplomatic recognition of the new government to the favorable solution on the question of limits with Brazil in Amapá, still in 1890.

Under Bocaiúva’s instructions, Brazil accepted the compulsory arbitration and sought an understanding with the US. With the end of the Congress, Mendonça was immediately appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of 1st class in Washington (BUENO e CERVO, 2002:170-172). The “American Spirit” was, therefore, a basis of the new foreign policy regime established in Brazil. Quintino Bocaiúva tried to follow also a “republican” stance in his foreign policy, a concept that in his vocabulary was practically synonymous with the “American spirit” mentioned (BUENO e CERVO, 2002:162).

Salvador de Mendonça, as mentioned, remained in the US as minister plenipotentiary in Washington. Finished the Pan-American Congress and achieved the American recognition of the republican government, Mendonça started a new task: the commercial rapprochement between the US and Brazil. On January 31, 1891, he took an important step in this matter with the signing in Washington of the Reciprocity Treaty between Brazil and the US, known as Blaine-Mendonça Agreement. This treaty established a customs agreement with preferential tariffs between the two countries. It suffered a lot of criticism, but was still recognized by the
Brazilian Congress (SMITH, 1991:7, 14-19, 26, 31). In the following month was enacted a Republican Constitution in Brazil, inspired by the American model.

Reflecting the Marshall Floriano government’s instability, more than five foreign ministers occupied the office between 1891 and 1894 (BUENO e CERVO, 2002:163). However, the analysis conducted so far already allows to demonstrate an important point: before Rio Branco assumed as chancellor, in 1902, the foreign policy of the republic already had an Americanist character. However, unlike the Americanism of the Baron of Rio Branco and Joaquim Nabuco, this Americanism from 1889 to 1902 was eminently ideological in character, and it was not necessarily North Americanist (BUENO e CERVO, 2002:167). It was mainly based on the republican ideal expressed by Quintino Bocaiúva, first chancellor of the Republic.

Quintino Bocaiuva’s foreign policy was far from universal praise. In 1893, Eduardo Prado (Rio Branco’s protégé) published The American Illusion, a book that criticized the republican's perception that Brazil and USA could be friends. Prado's opinion was basically realist: countries don't have friends, they have interests, and the USA would not give up interests simply to favor Brazil, doesn’t matter the regime similarity the two countries had now.

That same year Brazil faced the Revolta da Armada when the Navy in Rio de Janeiro rebelled against the Floriano government. Salvador de Mendonça managed to prevent the United States from recognizing the rebels as lawful belligerents, something that would have complicated the Floriano regime even more. The rebellion was defeated the following year with US aid, which intervened in favor of the established government (SMITH, 1991:20). But Brazil-USA relations went from bad to worse: later that year, in August, the US denounced the Treaty of Reciprocity signed in 1891, now considered of little value. The Brazil mimicked the gesture next month.

Also in 1893, Rio Branco returned to South America after a long period in Europe. He was appointed head of the mission entrusted to defend Brazil’s rights to the territory of Palmas or Missiones, disputed with Argentina. The matter was taken to arbitration of President Grover Cleveland. The Baron defended the case with President Cleveland, who decreed an entirely favorable arbitration award to the Brazilian claims on February 5, 1895 (SMITH, 1991:12, 27). One of the reasons for Cleveland's decision was that the disputed region was massively populated by Brazilians. In addition, the new frontier favored Brazil's defense. The Argentine arguments, on the other hand, were based more on feeling than on practicality (HILL, 1932:282-283).
In 1894 Prudente de Morais was elected the first civilian president of Brazil, ending the dictatorship of Floriano Peixoto. The foreign policy of his government would soon have to deal with difficulties: in January 1895 England secretly occupied the Trindade Island. Discovered the fact, the British claimed that it was a territory abandoned by Brazilians and that their goal was to use the island to connect submarine cables. At first, the Brazilian government rejected a proposal of arbitration in this case, but eventually, after the mediation from Portugal, Britain recognized the sovereignty of Brazil on the island. Next May, shortly after the English invasion of Trindade, another European country disrespected the Brazilian sovereignty over its territory: France tried to occupy Amapá. This invasion was rejected by the local population (GARCIA, 2005:108). Brazil's difficulties worsened in the following years: in 1897, shortly after arriving at the White House, William McKinley proposed a treaty of trade reciprocity to Brazil, but Brazilians declined it due to the economic difficulties (SMITH, 1991:29-34).

In the midst of these events, in 1898, the Baron was in charge of advocating Brazil in another territorial dispute, this time the Amapá issue with France. This time the referee of the issue was Walter Hauser, president of the Federal Council of Switzerland. Again the decision of the arbitration, sentenced on December 1, 1900, was fully in favor of Brazil. The Oiapoque River was defined as border, according to the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 (rediscovered thanks to the Baron’s talent as historian). With one more diplomatic victory, the Baron acquired great popularity. After his mission in Amapá, he was appointed minister plenipotentiary in Berlin on December 31, 1900 (SMITH, 1991:38, 43, 49). Meanwhile, that same year, Salvador de Mendonça was removed from the legation of Brazil in Washington and sent to Lisbon, and replaced in the US by Assis Brasil. On the occasion of his departure from the United States, Mendonça was characterized as “America's friend” and “great Pan-American” in articles of American newspapers and by President McKinley himself. However, his removal to Lisbon was not approved by the Senate in Brazil, and eventually, he was exonerated of the new position (SMITH, 1991:33).

The following years were of great turmoil for Brazilian foreign policy and the international system in general. The First Hague Conference was held in 1899. Too entangled in domestic issues, Brazil did not participate. The Brazilian absence at the conference did not have permanent consequences, but at that moment Brazil left to the world an image of disinterest that contrasted with the tendencies of Brazilian foreign policy of the 19th century (SMITH, 1991:27-28, 57-58). The same year the Argentine president Julio Roca visited Brazil. It was the first visit by a foreign head of state to the country. Brazilian president
Campos Sales returned the gesture the following year, visiting Argentina in October. It was the first official visit by a Brazilian president to another country. This exchange of amenities could indicate the building of good relations between neighboring countries, but in the long run that was not exactly what happened. Among other factors, unlike Campos Sales, the Baron and Nabuco did not see Argentina with good eyes.

In 1901 began a crisis that marked the Baron’s relationship with the Foreign Ministry: the battle for Acre. The Bolivian Syndicate, an Anglo-American consortium based in New York, leased Acre from Bolivia in a granting similar to the chartered companies in Africa. In the same year, with the death of William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt became US president. At the same time, Brazil and England signed a treaty of arbitration in relation to British Guiana. The following year England won the Boer War in South Africa, which in theory freed her to engage in America with greater aplomb.

Conclusion

The Baron of Rio Branco was one of the most important diplomats in Brazilian history. His contributions to Brazilian foreign policy were many, highlighting the change of the Brazilian diplomatic axis from Europe (mainly England) to the United States. The Baron feared that Brazil would soon fall victim to European imperialism and that the country would not have the military means to defend itself. Faced with this, he understood that the diplomatic rapprochement with the US would be the best defense for Brazil. The Baron's perception that the United States was an emerging power and that the re-reading of the Monroe Doctrine by Theodore Roosevelt was positive for Brazil proved correct, and the foreign policy paradigm he established remained with little opposition until the early 1960s. As has been said, the Baron established an "unwritten alliance" with the United States.

The Baron was not alone. Joaquim Nabuco, chosen to be Brazil's first ambassador to Washington, had a very similar perception of early 20th century international relations, as well as other Brazilian intellectuals and leaders of that time. However, it is important to note that the Baron did not build his paradigm ex nihilo. The USA was the first country to recognize Brazil's independence from Portugal and had continuous diplomatic relations with it during the 19th century. Although Brazil-USA relations in that period were often cold and distant, and not always friendly, it should also be noticed that since the Civil War, and especially since the 1870s, the two countries experienced greater rapprochement, thanks to increasing commercial trade, deeper diplomatic relations, and even technological innovations,
besides USA's desire to be more present in Latin America's affairs. With all that in mind, Rio Branco's and Nabuco's contribution to Brazil-USA relations remain very important, but it can be better understood with a 19th-century background in mind.

References


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