While Kant’s writings on the philosophy of history have always been an object of interest, his views on history as such have not yet been studied in detail perhaps because there was never a clear notion that his views on the subject deserved attention at all or perhaps, too, because they were thought merely to be a part of his practical philosophy, not always easy to reconcile with it. The fact that his Physical Geography has recently become an object of attention, however, has prepared the way for going back to his works in search of his thoughts on this matter because, in Kant’s view, geography and history belong together as a way of expanding the realm of experience.

Nevertheless, Kant’s Physical Geography is neither the only nor even the most important source for uncovering his views on history. As shown below, the notes available from his Lectures on Logic contain many observations about the nature of historical knowledge, its method, and the specific challenges it poses for a philosophical mind. This alone could be a reason to qualify the traditionally held view that Kant’s remarks on history are merely an afterthought of his other epistemological interests. It would be more accurate to claim that his remarks on historical cognition constitute a paradigmatic reflection of his general epistemological views. For Kant “historiography is a respectable discipline” with its own object and method. Still, it is true that his remarks on history also pave the way to inquire after the ultimate meaning of historical events as a whole and, hence, after a philosophy of history.
1. Nature and divisions of historical knowledge

As Michael Young notes, Jäsche’s *Logic* manual, based on notes provided by Kant, should be treated with caution. Still, to the extent that most of the fragments on history collected in Jäsche’s *Logic* also appear almost word for word in other surviving transcripts of Kant’s lectures, there is some reason to think that those texts are representative of his views of history as a particular kind of cognition. The strong parallelisms among them also suggest that throughout the years, Kant’s views on history did not change in significant ways. Continuity is found, for example, in the Lectures on Logic in which Kant divides cognition into historical and rational cognition. “The latter – he says – includes, e.g. mathematica, and philosophy, the former geography and the proper history of history”. (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24.1:290.21-24). While this is a division according to the object, he also observes that not only the object (the subject matter), but also the perspective (the form) can be either historical or rational:

All learned writings are either historical or dogmatic. Writing can be historical both as to its material, if it is something that really happened or cognition of the individuo, and as to its form. That form which is not rational, where I do not derive by means of universal cognition of the grounds, is called historical (...) (V-Lo/Blomberg AA 24.1:296.32-297.3).12

The text is noteworthy because of the distinction it introduces between subject matter and form, at least in the sense that it leaves room for rational subjects to be treated historically. Although at first sight it might seem that Kant is introducing the issue of genres, his approach is an epistemological one, that is, if a given cognition does not spring from reason, it can be called historical, both from the perspective of the object, as well as from the perspective of the matter. As Muglioni summarizes, “the word ‘historical’ – historisch - designates empirical knowledge in general, ex datis, by opposition to rational knowledge, ex principiis.” Thus, in the quoted passage, the object as such is regarded as historical insofar as it revolves around something that has happened or involves cognition of individual things. In Kant’s view, however, dealing with individual and contingent things, entails that history as such has nothing to do with reason, for he expounds rationality in terms of necessary connection to universal principles. This thought is explicitly conveyed in the *Philippi Logic*. History is not concerned with necessary laws or universal principles, but rather, with “actualia quae sunt objecta sensum” (V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24.1:398.33). This contrast between reason and the senses is at the bottom of the two basic perspectives, with which, according to Kant, cognition can be approached:

The division of cognitions according to concepts is a logical division; the division according to time and space is the physical one. Through the former we get a system of nature; through the latter, a geographical natural description (...) we can both, history and geography, equally characterize as descriptions, with the difference that the former is a description according to time, and the latter according to space (PG, AA 09:159.34-2; 160.28-30).

The distinction between “system” and “descriptions” goes back to the distinction between the universal cognition of the foundations, proper to rational knowledge, and the sensible knowledge of “what happens”, the object of historical cognition, which is marked by
its contingent character. This means that historical cognition cannot be explained in terms of the universal concepts of the power of understanding, but only registered in terms of the *a priori* forms of sensibility, namely, in terms of space and time: “Everything that happens is considered in connection with space and time…” (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24.1:297.7-8). Hence, history and geography are not primarily concerned with providing a system of nature, but are rather engaged in a description of phenomena, according to space and time.

Given the dignity of rational knowledge – its connection with necessary principles – Kant’s account of historical-geographical knowledge just in terms of “description” could seem to demean those activities. To see this approach in a more favourable light, however, it is advisable to take a look at the way he introduces his *Physical Geography*. In this work, Kant explains that the sources of our knowledge are pure reason or experience, whereby reason is instructed by experience starting with our senses\(^1\). Yet, the senses just provide us with knowledge about the present world\(^2\), which is not enough in order to know the world, for, on the one hand, we only live a short period of time and, on the other, we cannot visit all places. We must, instead, rely on the experience of others through stories and descriptions. History and Geography represent, therefore, two ways of expanding our experience, our knowledge of the world\(^3\). Thus, although similar events or actions may invite us to draw regularities that, in certain cases, may even resemble the regularities of rational cognition, what makes historical cognition unique is that it increases experience, with the knowledge of individual cases irreplaceable in space and time.

Indeed, historical cognition thus understood, i.e., as dealing with “what happens”, is to be divided into history and geography. Kant often observes that history and geography should not be kept separate\(^4\) since they represent two complementary approaches to the description of individual events responsible for enlarging the realm of our experience. Accordingly, in the *Physical Geography*, Kant defines history by reference to geography, as “eine continuirliche Geographie”\(^5\). More generally, geography represents the reference point available to all sorts of cognitive approaches\(^6\) just like in the *Philippi Logic*, where Kant speaks not only of physical geography, but also of political geography, theological geography, and moral geography\(^7\). In the *Blomberg Logic*, however, he seems to privilege the historical perspective, insofar as he describes the difference between history and geography by resorting merely to “time”. Accordingly, the defining mark of history consists in its consideration of “what happens” through time; by contrast, the defining mark of geography consists in its consideration of “what happens” at the same time:

> When one considers what happens insofar as it is at different times, however, this is called history, but insofar as it is at the same time it belongs to the field of geography. There are various kinds of geography and history (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24.1:297.7-11)\(^8\).

Can any conclusion be drawn from the characterization of geography by reference to “time” instead of “space”? Perhaps the only conclusion to draw is that Kant thinks of space in terms of time, namely, in terms of “any given point in time”. But there is perhaps a further reason for this. Consider the fact that in dealing with geographical entities he is also dealing with things “that happen”, i.e. historical cognitions and the fact that time is the “substance” of what happens, or rather, its lack of substance. In any case, the fact that history – both history
and geography – deals with “what happens” leaves room for further division of its object, according to a diversity of cognitive interests, whose only point in common is the fact that they extend reason, and provide material – in Kant’s own words — “for the use of reason”.

Along these lines, Kant also divides history “into political history, church history, learned history and private history”. While, in this case, Kant leaves out “natural history”, which he extensively treated in three of his other essays – On the Different Races of Human Beings (1775), Determination of the Concept of a Human Race (1785), On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy (1788) — he does explicitly mention what he calls “moral history”, which he considers “the morals of common life and also moral data”. (V-Lo/Blomberg AA 24.1:297.16-17)²⁵ It is clear that by referring to “moral data”, Kant is not referring to morality in its strict sense since, by definition, the moral dimension of an action cannot be observed from the outside; in this context, “moral data” are nothing other than the “mores”, which are also the object of his Anthropology, and could eventually become the object of sociology, as in Durkheim’s case. This, at least, is implicit in the analogy he draws between biography— “the life of a single subject”— and history, which chronicles the life, the moral data, of an entire society and even, of the entire human species. From this perspective, even the discussion of the concept of race may be found to serve a moral purpose since Kant sees racial differences as dependent on climate adaptation, meaning that there is no fundamental difference among races, but rather a single human species, which can eventually be considered the subject of a single universal history²⁶.

The practical purpose of all historical knowledge, however, is present in Kant’s observation that “all history, of whichever kind it may be, should have the end of extending reason; it should provide the material for the use of reason”. (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24.1:297.18-20). Indeed, in exploring the “use of reason”, Kant already points to the fact that historical knowledge is not an ultimate end; rather, it furnishes reason with data useful for rational knowledge²⁷ or, more generally, for a variety of purposes, which, in Kant’s terms, is another name for “culture”. This is at the basis of the distinction that Kant introduces between “learned history” and “pragmatic history”:

That history which becomes useful through universal rules is called pragmatic; this can have a relation either to speculation or to practical reason. If one learns merely the names of the sovereigns and knows their reigns, then this provides little material for the use of reason, i.e, for speculation, or for practical rules. In the beginning, nonetheless, one must abstract from the use of reason and equip oneself optimistically with many historical cognitions. Learned history becomes pragmatic when one considers learnedness in relation to human reason, if one looks to its growth or to the causes by which it is held back (…) (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24.1:297.22-32).

In all this, Kant’s focus is on history proper, that is, human history or the history of freedom rather than “natural history”²⁸, as shown above. While one could consider the exclusion of natural history a sign that only humanity can be considered an intrinsically historical subject²⁹, this view would contradict Kant’s approach in other texts, where he signals that the strict use of the term “history” only requires being able to recount any process from its origins. Thus, for example, in the Physical Geography, he sustains that the designation “natural
history" is not adequate based on the fact that nobody can really provide a complete, written account of natural events starting at the beginning of time. Still, according to the *Philippi Logic*, Kant says that the mere description of nature would also count as historical knowledge simply because it deals with “actualia quae sunt objecta sensuum” whose description is carried out through a period of time. Along the same lines, in the *Critique of Judgment*, he explicitly says that natural history is concerned with a description of nature— or, rather, of its origins— conjectured on the basis of observable phenomena. As Monique Castillo notes, the contrast Kant intends to draw between a description of nature and a history of nature points at the crucial difference between mere recollection of facts and the introduction of a narrative thread.

2. HISTORICITY, HISTORICAL SCIENCE, AND NARRATIVE

From a contemporary perspective, it might seem that Kant's concept of history is very rudimentary, insofar as he reduces the historical dimension to the empirical recounting of “actualia quae sunt objecta sensuum” regardless of whether these objects are linked to the exercise of human freedom or to the evolution of natural processes. While he was certainly aware of the difference between a history of nature and a history of freedom, his main explicit concern was to show that the “historical” account of events is not in conflict with the “scientific” approach to those events in terms of “natural laws”. Indeed, as we know, Kant also takes human events as subject to this twofold consideration such that, although they are attributable to freedom from a practical perspective, as appearances they are not very different from other natural events, equally subject to natural laws. From this perspective, they, too, should be explained in conformity with some sort of universal laws, to be inferred from observable history, as he writes in his *Idea for a Universal History*:

> Whatever concept one may form of freedom of the will in a metaphysical context, its appearances, human actions, like all other natural events, are certainly determined in conformity with universal natural laws. History—which concerns itself with providing a narrative of those appearances, regardless of how deeply hidden they causes may be—allows us to hope that if we examine the play of the human will’s freedom in the large, we can discover its course to conform to rules as well as to hope that what strikes us as complicated and unpredictable in the single individual may in the history of the entire species be discovered to be the steady progress and slow development of its original capacities (IaG, AA 08:17.1-12).

With those words, Kant makes clear his approach to history in terms of narrative, which is supposed to make sense of observable facts or events by suggesting a regular course of events that is only discoverable by going beyond the individual perspective to adopt the perspective of the entire species. This regularity does not coincide with the universal laws in charge of providing us with a causal explanation of phenomena: while universal laws of nature can explain the physical existence of certain facts — be they natural or human facts— they are insufficient for making those facts intelligible to us. Intelligibility requires finding a connection between facts and the interests of reason. As argued below, for Kant, this comes to be the
ultimate reason of historical narrative, providing human beings with a connection between otherwise unintelligible human events and the ends of reason39.

From this perspective, historical narrative responds primarily to the third interest of reason that asks “what may I hope?” (A805/B833). This mitigates Kant’s own distinction between “learned history” and “pragmatic history”, if only we take the “pragmatic” bent of history broadly enough to encompass intelligibility and hope. Kant himself, however, took the pragmatic character of history in more conventional terms: while learned history looks at knowledge per se, pragmatic history looks to the possible employment of that knowledge. Such a distinction not only projects upon historical knowledge the difference between speculative and practical reason, but is also relevant for identifying the specific character of scientific knowledge when deprived from subordination to any other interest. Indeed, because of its interested character, all pragmatic history goes beyond the rules of science, even if it has to maintain the requirements of healthy reason, and its logical perfection: “in all sciences and learnedness the method of healthy reason must reign”, even if “everything that occurs in learnedness need not also, conversely, occur in healthy reason”. According to Kant, the defining feature of “healthy reason” is its embodiment in particular experiences. By contrast, the defining feature of learnedness is the acquisition of knowledge in abstraction of any possible use:

In all sciences I look not to how something appears in employment, but instead to how it can be judged before any employment. I look to how something can be thought in abstracto, too; but if, on the contrary, I proceed according to the rules of healthy reason, then I must show everything in concreto. The second kind is a cognition that brings with it a certain life. The first, however, serves only for speculation and curiosity (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24.1:290.10-17).

Now, in my view, the distinction between speculative-learned and lively-pragmatic history may also be relevant for understanding the difference between history as a science and a philosophy of history. Indeed, although no philosophy of history can be considered simply in narrow “pragmatic” terms, it could be so considered if only we widen the scope of human interests so as to include the fundamental interests of reason, since the latter is interested in making sense of human history in general so that human beings can find a hospitable soil for the hopeful exercise of moral freedom in nature.

3. History as a Science

In the PhL, Kant distinguishes between doctrine (a complex of different cognitions), a discipline (if that complex is subject to a method) and a science (cognition, according to method– hence a discipline - brought into completion). (See V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24.1: 483.20-25). To the extent that he is ready to accept that not all science follows a deductive pattern, Kant takes history to be a science; sometimes he suggests it can also be a doctrine in the sense previously indicated– a complex of different cognitions. In this vein, in the Blomberg Logic he says that history “belongs to no doctrine, but it is just as much a doctrine as dogmatic truths”. (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24.1:293.1-2). Being a doctrine in this sense does not entail being a
discipline, although it does not exclude it either. At other times, however, Kant reserves the term “doctrine” for the science that can be proved from a priori principles such that neither history nor any other empirical science could be called a doctrine (V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24.2: 506.5-10). Still, not being a doctrine in this sense does not prevent him from recognizing the scientific character of history because there can be science without demonstrations and the example he gives of this is precisely history⁴⁰.

Lacking “demonstration”, however, is not the same as lacking certainty. If historical cognition is to be regarded as a science, it has to strive for certainty. This certainty, however, is of a peculiar kind. Kant stresses that for the most part, our historical knowledge stems from belief⁴¹. This highlights the importance of witnesses; depending on whether they are “eye-witness” or “ear-witness”, “subordinate witnesses” or “coordinate witnesses”, the certitude of the experience they transmit decreases or increases⁴². Resorting to citations rests upon beliefs⁴³. In the Blomberg Logic Kant speaks of “comparative certainty”, as opposed to the apodictic certainty proper to rational cognition:

Comparative certainty is the relation of the grounds of the holding-to-be-true to the grounds of the opposite. Apodictic certainty, however, is absolute and consists in the relation of the grounds of the holding-to-be-true to the sufficient ground. History is certain merely comparative, never apodictically. Morals, however, and therein the jus naturale in particular, contains many apodictic certainties. Also distinct from apodictic certainty is mathematical certainty in intuition, which is evident (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24.1:225.23-31).

While the certainty proper to rational cognitions is ultimately referred to the principle of sufficient ground, the certainty proper to historical cognitions rests upon comparison of empirical cognitions⁴⁴ or competing explanations. At any rate, in order to achieve this kind of certainty, historical knowledge must follow a method. The lack of method results in “tumultuous” thinking⁴⁵. Method alone brings knowledge into discipline, preparing the path for science. Now, according to Kant,

In historical sciences one has two methods, the chronological and the geographical. The two can be combined with each other. The last is better than the first. In all cognitions that hang together one must first take into consideration the whole rather than its parts, and of the parts the large ones rather than the small ones, the higher division rather than the lower (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24.1:292.27-33)⁴⁶.

Interestingly enough, in spite of explaining geography in terms of time—geography deals with natural events in present time — Kant tends to subordinate history to geography⁴⁷ and speaks of a “geographical method” that he holds superior to the chronological method⁴⁸. To judge from the above quote, this preference is based on the fact that the geographical method, by allowing one to consider “what happens” at any given moment in time, paves the way for the consideration of a whole (globus terraqueus, he says in MS, AA 06:352.10-11) and thus, for a kind of knowledge that resembles more the idea of systematic knowledge. He holds that human beings have a natural drive towards systemic knowledge⁴⁹, be it rational or historical
systems. By contrast, one of his frequent concerns about historical knowledge has to do with its extensiveness and indeterminacy:

Many sciences are of such a kind that, with the passage of time, human capacities will be overstepped by their extent. Thus history, e.g., is already very extensive: with time and its duration, more and more is always happening. These all add to history, and this science finally will thus become extensive and grow, so that our memory will finally be far too small. For it is already quite hard now (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24.1:74.15-16).

Kant somehow anticipates the “tragedy of culture” (Simmel) resulting from the split between objective and subjective culture, which he conveys in terms of history (as a science) and memory (as a subjective capacity). Yet, in order to prevent this result, he is also ready to develop an alternative, rational account of history, which, as anticipated above, resembles natural science insofar as it takes a universal approach to human affairs and aims at discovering regularities in historical events. Before turning to this alternative account— which is, in fact, an anticipation of sociological science — it is worth considering his other remarks about method, given that they offer some clarification on his approach to history as a science.

There are two methods of composing dogmatic writings, either tumultuously or methodically. The latter method brings about a system. A system is a whole. Systematic writings differ from tumultuous writings in that they constitute a whole that fits together. Excerpts are actually systems. The principia of dogmatists have to be expounded in dogmatic writings, then pulled together and considered in concreto. And one must mix with this something historical, in order to provide evidence (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24.1:297.32-298.4).

The role of method is to systematize knowledge. Writing methodically is opposed to writing tumultuously; although Kant seems to refer to the composition of dogmatic writings in the previous passage, this division is also relevant to the distinction drawn below between polyhistory and rational history because polyhistory is marked by its indefiniteness, while rational history is marked by its systematic ambitions, which is to say, its philosophical ambitions. As conveyed in the Jäsche Logic,

Scholars in matters of reason are commonly ignorant historically. Historical knowledge without determinate limits is polyhistory (...). Mere polyhistory is cyclopic learnedness, which lacks one eye, the eye of philosophy, and a cyclops among mathematicians, historians, natural historians, philologists, and linguistics is a learned man who is great in all these matters, but who for all that holds all philosophy to be dispensable (Log, AA 09:45.20-21;28-32).

According to the Philippi Logic, Kant defines “polyhistory” as “historical knowledge of the total horizon of the human being” (V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24.1: 383.24-25). By “horizon” Kant means “the congruence of the limits of our cognition with the ends of mankind and of men. Thus, it is a complex of cognition which, taken together, are adequate to our ends” (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24.2: 814.10-12). While the horizon of historical knowledge resists exact determination, the philosophical eye can help us discern the purpose of all knowledge, so as to avoid mere polyhistory. At any rate, the fact that Kant reflects on the need for
a philosophical eye to avoid mere polyhistory does not prevent him from considering the specificity of the historical method in a more mundane way by, for instance, noting the difference between working from primary sources and working as a *compilator*.

The method where one does not draw cognition from one’s own sources but instead takes from those who have drawn from the source, is called compilation. History is compiled if I have assembled it not from primary sources but instead from later ones. One can also compile philosophy, where one gathers together what others have thought by means of reason. One proves his skill, however, if, with clever selection, one pulls together the most important things from authors who possess great acuity, from the most through histories. The compilator is distinct from the *plagiarius*, of course. This last pretends to have drawn from the primary learned sources, although he only exhibits someone else’s product (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24.1:298.6-17)55.

While distinguishing the *compilator* from the true historian, Kant does recognize a skill proper to the good compilator, namely, her ability to select “the most important things”. This skill, however, requires acquaintance with a vast amount of knowledge. Accordingly, the good compilator is usually someone deserving of the name “polyhistor”.

4. The notion of “Polyhistory”

As noted above, Kant distinguishes between rational and historical cognitions, that is, between sciences of reason and historical sciences. Following the *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*, he equates historical sciences and learnedness: “the complex of historical sciences is learnedness”. By contrast, “the complex of sciences of reason has no particular name, for its parts, philosophy and mathematics, are simply too very different”. In this account of his Logic, Kant would apply the name “polyhistory” to “the complex of all sciences” (V-Lo/ Dohna, AA 24.2:715.29-33).

In the *Vienna Logic*, by contrast, he distinguishes between “historical polyhistoria”—meaning “learnedness extended without determinate limits”—and “polymathia”—meaning “the knowledge of reason extended without determinate limits”. “The two together”, he adds, “can be called pansophia”56, a term that is obviously different from “philosophy” in that the latter does not necessarily bring with it an incredible amount of knowledge, but rather a legislation of reason and a principle of judgment. The conceptual distinctions introduced in the *Vienna Logic* are more closely aligned than the *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic* with the most reliable text we have, the *Jäsche Logic*, in which Kant distinguishes between polyhistory, polymathia, and pansophia:

Scholars in matters of reason are commonly ignorant historically. Historical knowledge without determinate limits is polyhistory; this puffs one up. Polymathy has to do with cognition of reason. Both historical and rational knowledge, when extended without determinate limits, can be called pansophy (Log, AA 09:45. 20-24).

At the same time, a similar reference to “cyclopic” learning in the *Jäsche Logic* gives ground to think that “polyhistory” can be applied generally to vast learnedness in all branches of knowledge. No matter how we delimitate the term “polyhistory”, the basic idea is clear: “in the sciences… there is a difference between those that can be drawn from reason and those that
must not be taught based on reason, such as geography, etc”. Likewise, it is clear that, while recognizing that “in the previous seculum the inclination of most men ran towards polyhistoria”, Kant is particularly interested in providing knowledge–including historical knowledge–with a philosophical eye. Now, “historical knowledge includes the science of the tools of learnedness–philology, which comprises a critical acquaintance with books and languages (literature and linguistics)” (Log, AA 09:45.24-27). Philology thus understood does not merely include the cultivation of science, but also the cultivation of taste. Indeed,

One part of philology is constituted by the *humaniora*, by which is understood acquaintance with the ancients, which furthers the unification of science with taste, which rubs off coarseness ad furthers the communicability and urbanity in which humanity consists (Log, AA 09:45.33-37).

This is consistent with the characteristics of the polyhistor that Kant presents in the *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*. The polyhistor must be a humanist “well-acquainted with the ancients and the fine arts (poetic and rhetorical art)”, he must be a linguist “well-acquainted with ancient languages, because here it is a matter of independent, lasting models”, and he must be a literator, i.e., “someone well-acquainted with books” (V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24.2:714.33). As suggested above, this brings him close to the philologist since “philology is the complex of all instruments of learnedness” the “cognition of the tools for the study of the ancients” (V-Lo/ Wiener, AA 24.2: 818.13), and is completed by adding the taste of the humanist57. The fact that both history and philology come together under the figure of the polyhistor is significant of the intimate relation between history and philology, insofar as historians work with ancient documents and languages58. Now, according to Kant, the knowledge acquired by the polyhistor, admirable as it is, calls for a philosophical eye, which Kant first introduces for moral reasons:

He who is acquainted with many languages is a linguist, and taken together these constitute the great learned man. This is great knowledge, of which Paul says it inflates. For if the polyhistor is acquainted with so many books, he believes he knows as much as those who wrote them, although he is acquainted with them only historically. Philosophy can tear down pride and make evident one's true ends. Learnedness without philosophy is cyclopic learnedness. Philosophy is the second eye, and it sees how all the cognitions of the one eye with reference to a common end (V-Lo/ Wiener, AA 24.2: 818.26-35).

While many would surely be moved to discuss the idea that philosophy tears down the pride instilled by great knowledge, the most relevant point here is the reference to philosophy as “the second eye”, which brings all other cognitions towards a common end. Indeed, philosophy's desire for unity introduces order in the vast knowledge available to the polyhistor by referring it to the needs and the ends of reason. This is part of what Kant sees as to “orient oneself in thinking”59, which is at the basis of any historical narrative, and, ultimately, at the basis of any philosophy of history.
5. Philosophy of History

As advanced above, historical narrative is responsible for providing human beings with a link between human events and the interests of reason. Now, while reason is ultimately interested in making sense of worldly appearances so as to encourage hope in the realization of the human moral vocation, this big, ultimate narrative, does not necessarily exclude other intermediate narratives that serve other short-term interests. This applies, for example, to what Kant calls “pragmatic history”, an aspect of that “knowledge of the world” required for the advancement of human interests and happiness. Moreover, history as such could be viewed in this pragmatic light to the extent it enlarges our “knowledge of the world” and makes us cultured beings, i.e., skilled for many purposes. From this perspective, even natural history belongs to historical knowledge insofar as it helps explain the emergence of human nature and races—what is called physical or physiological anthropology—and thereby serves not only the interest of knowledge, but also broadens the realm of human experience in ways that can be found useful for orienting ourselves in the world. Yet, in the light of the human moral vocation, all this knowledge calls for a philosophical eye that articulates it so as to attempt to satisfy reason’s interest in hope. This philosophical labour, which as we read below takes the form of a “moral history”, is ultimately necessary because hope in human progress towards the good may actually be challenged by the multiplicity and strangeness of human events:

If it is asked whether the human race at large is progressing perpetually toward the better, the important thing is not the natural history of man (whether new races may arise in the future), but rather his moral history, and more precisely, his history not as a species according to the generic notion (singulorum), but as the totality of men united socially on earth and apportioned into peoples (universorum) (SF, AA 07: 79.12-17).

In speaking of “moral history” (Sittengeschichte), Kant is thinking not in the history of the human species as such, i.e., as a specific natural kind, but rather in the history of the human species as subject to a common and politically articulated moral destiny: “the totality of men united socially on earth and apportioned into peoples”. To this end, however, we need more than a scientific account of events, which is the role of historical science. Instead, Kant calls for a narrative stemming from reason’s interests, specifically, reason’s interest in realizing the highest good in spite of all appearances. Indeed,

A certain feeling of indignation when one sees men’s actions placed on the great stage of the world and finds that, despite some individuals’ seeming wisdom, in the large everything is finally woven together from folly and childish vanity and often childish malice and destructiveness. In the end, one does not know what concept one should have of a species so taken with its own superiority (IaG, AA 08: 17.32-18.5).

Kant’s philosophy of history, then, constitutes a narrative starting out of a moral concern, as a sort of “anthropodicy”, a justification of the human species in spite all historical appearances. As Castillo points out, history presents itself as the first enemy of the idea of progress. The purpose of Kant’s philosophy of history is to provide us with sufficient ground for hoping that current injustice and stupidity is not the last word on humanity, for hoping that the seeds of
good implicit in man’s moral vocation will prevail above all evil appearances. The question is how to construct such a narrative so that it does not become just a nice, but baseless story. Kant is well aware that “the philosopher cannot assume that in the great human drama mankind has a rational end of its own” since appearance alone does not justify that thought. Therefore, he speculates on the possibility of finding a guiding thread that, while overcoming particular human intentions, nevertheless contributes to the fulfilment of the moral end sketched above: “the totality of men united socially on earth and apportioned into peoples”. He expects to find this guiding thread in “nature”, which, as we know from his writings on philosophy of history, is just another name for Providence. Thus, the philosopher’s only point of departure is to try to discover whether there is some natural objective in this senseless history of creatures who proceed without a plan of their own but in conformity with some definite plan of nature’s (IaG, AA 08:18.6-9).

This is exactly the purpose of his essay *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent* (1784). It amounts to “finding a guiding thread for such a history”, which, nevertheless, he does not plan to write himself, but rather, already in an exercise of hope, leaves “to nature to produce the man who is in a position to write it” (IaG, AA 08:18.13) just like it produced a Kepler or a Newton in unexpected ways. This reference to Kepler and Newton is suggestive of the kind of history Kant considers necessary to write in order to make sense of human events; he is not interested in a merely faithful register of individual actions and events, but rather is interested in a search for regularities that can be explained in the light of general rules and deciphered by the philosopher in terms of “the plan of nature” to help fulfil the human moral vocation. If those words, in general, can be taken to advance the seeds of a social theory, delineated according to the model of natural science, they also display a peculiar reflexivity that constitutes a nascent sociology of knowledge. Indeed, the man in charge of writing that history, supposedly in the name of nature, would be himself a product of nature. Now, is this not the characterization of genius?

Genius is the talent (natural gift) that gives the rule to art. Since the talent, as an inborn productive faculty of the artist, itself belongs to nature, this could also be expressed thus: Genius is the inborn predisposition of the mind (*ingenium*) through which nature gives the rule to art (KU, AA 05: 307.11-15).

While Kant is far from equating science and art, his words do invite the reader to discover the analogy between creativity in art and creativity in the sciences. In his *Idea for a Universal History*, however, he is interested in providing a reasonable narrative that, along with being the basis for the scientific account of history that ultimately equates to social sciences, can also justify human hope in the face of apparently senseless events. While this narrative requires inserting some speculative considerations into historical discourse, it should nevertheless be distinguished from fiction:

Surely it is permissible to insert speculations in the progression of a history in order to fill out gaps in the reports, because what comes before, as distant cause, and what follows, as effect, can give a fairly reliable clue for discovering the intervening causes so as to make the transition comprehensible. To produce a
history entirely from speculations alone seems no better than to sketch a romance. Thus it could not go by the name of speculative history but rather only that of fiction (MAM, AA 08: 109.1-9).

Some have argued that, when Kant wrote these words, he had Herder's speculative history in mind. Precisely in order to distinguish his philosophy of history from that of Herder, Kant deliberately set limits to speculation by resorting to an analogy with nature with the assumption that nature’s stability provides a basis for inferring the first development of human freedom:

What may not be ventured regarding the progression of the history of human actions, can nonetheless be attempted through speculation regarding their first beginnings, as far as these are made by nature. For this speculation need not be fictional, but can instead be based on experience, if one presupposes that in their first beginnings these actions were no better or worse than we now find them to be, a presupposition that conforms to the analogy of nature and has no risky consequences. A history of freedom’s first development, from its original capacities in the nature of man, is therefore something different from the history of freedom’s progression, which can only be based on reports (MAM, AA 08: 109.9-20).

Accordingly, his “guiding thread” for scientific history is conjectured from a reflective consideration of nature. Indeed, in a move clearly aligned with the Stoic tradition, Kant takes nature to convey the basic wisdom upon which every other principle of judgment rests. While, as Allison has remarked, Kant’s own philosophical foundation for this thesis is provided in the third Critique, it is in Idea where he more explicitly articulates the principle inspiring this sort of historical narrative: “all of a creature’s natural capacities are destined to develop completely and in conformity with their end” (IaG, AA 08:18.19-20). Once this principle is assumed, one has to conclude that the subject of that “history” cannot be the individual, but rather the human species. Indeed, each individual man would have to live excessively long if he were to make complete use of all his natural capacities; or if nature has given him only a short lease on life (as is actually the case), she requires a perhaps incalculable sequence of generations, each passing its enlightenment on to the next, to bring its seeds in our species to the stage of development that completely fulfills nature’s objective. And the goal of his efforts must be that point in time, at least among the ideas of men, since the natural capacities must otherwise be regarded as in large part purposeless and vain. In that case all practical principles would have to be given up, and nature, whose wisdom serves as a fundamental principle in judging all other arrangements, would in the sole case of man have to be suspected of childish play (IaG, AA 08:19.3-16).

Kant does not want to renounce all rationality in human affairs and he therefore looks to nature for a basic rationality that no human action can ever overturn. This move, however, goes in both directions: while he looks to nature for a basic rationality in human affairs, he assumes that reason has a natural interest in rationality. In other words, nature is to be found, first of all, in reason itself and constitutes another name for the interests of reason. On this basis, Kant’s argument follows easily: nature would contradict reason if it had provided us with capacities that remain undeveloped. Since they do remain undeveloped at the individual level, we should assume that they will be developed throughout history. This, of course, entails
“upgrading” the historical unit from the individual to the species. Although this shift might suggest a certain depreciation of the individual, Kant backs his position with a moral argument that ultimately serves to preserve individual dignity: were we not to defend nature’s rationality, with the sort of argument presented above, “all practical principles would have to be given up” (IaG, AA 08:19.13).

If it is true that, by advocating the rationality of nature as the corner stone of scientific knowledge of history and as the basis of practical principles, Kant takes sides with teleology against Epicureanism (IaG, AA 08:25.9), then, by assuming that there is a meaningful historical narrative, he projects that teleology upon the human species. While this thought is explicitly articulated in the third Critique, it was already anticipated in pre-critical writings⁷⁰. In the context of this teleological approach to nature, and somehow replicating the *ergon* argument that Aristotle used for the individual on the level of the human species, he wonders: “is it truly rational to assume that nature is purposive in its parts but purposeless as a whole?” (IaG, AA08: 25.31-33). Now, what is the purpose of history as a whole? As indicated above, Kant suggests that it is the realization of humanity’s natural capacities; yet, to this end, he thinks it is important to advance “an internal, and… also an externally perfect national constitution”:

One can regard the history of the human species, in the large, as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally, and for this purpose, also an externally perfect national constitution, as the sole state in which all of humanity’s natural capacities can be developed. This thesis is a consequence of the foregoing one (IaG, AA08:27.1-8).

Yet, is there any empirical basis to support this idea, apart from the rationality of nature? Can we recognize any sign that suggests a development towards betterment? This is a question that Kant explicitly raises in *An Old Question Raised Again*, where he explicitly sets out to find a “historical sign”, which supports the idea of the progress of the human species towards a moral state. Already in *Idea* he had noted that in order to support this position, it is important to find a basis in experience:

One sees that philosophy also has its chiliastic vision, but one whose occurrence can be promoted by its idea, through only from afar, and it is thus anything but fanciful. The issue, then, is whether experience can uncover something like a course leading to this objective of nature’s (IaG, AA 08: 27.8-12).

At this precise point, based again on the systemic structure of the universe, Kant draws a significant analogy with astronomy: just as astronomical observation allows us to discover the existence of a system of stars, observation of human affairs should lead us to think of a historical cycle, the only problem being that cycles take such a long time to complete that we cannot infer the relationship of the parts to the whole with much certainty (see IaG, AA 08:27.12-19). Yet, since there is no agreement as to the order of history, Kant needs to prove first that history can be regarded as a whole⁷¹ and he does so by resorting again to the systemic order of nature, as required by the interest of reason:

Nonetheless, based on the premise that the universe has a systematic structure, and from the little that man has observed, we can justifiably conclude that such a cycle actually exists. Furthermore,
human nature is so constituted as to be incapable of indifference toward even the most distant epoch through which our species must go, if only it can be expected with certainty. This is especially so in the present case, where it appears that we can by our own rational organization hasten this happy time for posterity. For this reason its faintest signs of approach will be very important to us (IaG, AA 08:27.19-29).

Both arguments lead us to the possibility and convenience of a philosophical history, i.e., “a universal history of the world in accord with a plan of nature that aims at a perfect civic union of the human species must be regarded as possible and even as helpful to this objective of nature’s” (IaG, AA 08:29.1-6). While Kant is perfectly aware of the strangeness of this attempt, his main concern is to stress that sketching a universal history in accordance with a rational goal does not result in a “romance”, a novel, but it is rather an internal requirement of reason (IaG, AA 08: 29.10). In this spirit, he dares to project his philosophical eye upon history from Greece to his own times only to discover “a course of improvement conforming to rules in the constitutions of the nations on our continent (which will in all likelihood eventually give laws to all others)” (IaG, AA 08:30.26-27). Summarizing ideas already found in Hume’s account of the civilizatory process, he sketches a philosophy of history, which revolves around the introduction of civil constitutions and laws, as the basis for human progress and enlightenment. In this juridical reading of history he believes that he discover[s] a guiding thread that can serve not only to clarify the thoroughly confused play of human affairs, or to aid in the political art of prophesying future changes in and among nations (a use that has already been made of history, even when it has been regarded as the incoherent product of ungoverned freedom). It will also clear the way for (what, without presupposing a plan of nature, one cannot reasonably hope for) a comforting view of the future, one in which we represent from afar how the human species finally works its way up to that state where all the seeds nature has planted in it can be developed fully and in which the species’ vocation here on earth can be fulfilled (IaG, AA 08:30.8-18).

Far from mixing historical knowledge and philosophy of history, Kant views this latter endeavor as a way of justifying nature—i.e., providence. This represents “no unimportant motive for adopting a particular perspective in observing the world” (IaG, AA 08:30.20). Established on the grounds of a teleological conception of nature, this justification is required by reason’s inborn interest in meaning and hope:

For what use is to laud and recommend observing the majesty and wisdom of creation in the non-rational realm of nature, if that part of the great theatre of supreme wisdom that contains the purpose of all the rest- the history of the human race- should remain an endless reproach to it, the sight of which compels us against our wills to turn our eyes away from it and, since we despair of ever finding a perfectly rational objective in it, brings us to the point of hoping for that end only in another world? (IaG, AA 08:30.21-28).

In light of these latter words, it is possible to conclude that Kant’s philosophy of history is meant to provide a justification of humanity in its worldly existence. Indeed, while not excluding a further reflection on religion and hence a philosophy of religion, the specific outcome of his reflection on history provides an “objective narrative” to encourage human
hope in the realization of the human moral vocation, in spite of all appearances, i.e., in spite of evil and disaster. The compatibility of this “objective” narrative of hope with a “subjective” narrative of moral responsibility has often been seen as problematic. Indeed, if nature works secretly and somewhat independently from individual human agents, for the realization of the human moral vocation, does it not make moral agency superfluous?

While Kant’s answer to this question largely depends on keeping the morality and the efficacy of human agency strictly separate, the question per se invites reflection on two fronts. On the practical side, it invites reflection on the role that practical faith can play in the mobilization of historical responsibility; on the theoretical side, it invites reflection both on nature’s resourcefulness, which, through man’s unsocial sociability pragmatically “forces” mankind to enter into a civil constitution, and also on the role a self-conscious writer, enjoying freedom of speech, can play to advance the cause of enlightenment and freedom by developing this teleological narrative. At least, this is something that Kant himself suggests at the end of his short essay, as he tries to explain the peculiar character of the “a priori” history he has attempted to sketch. He assumes almost as a natural fact that future generations will be interested in historical events and processes only insofar as these advance the cause of freedom and cosmopolitanism; but awareness of this fact, which the philosopher of history is meant to awaken among his fellow citizens, may become a pragmatic incentive for political leaders, willing to be remembered by history, to act so as to advance that very end (See IaG, AA 08:31.5-10). With this view, Kant does not merely reflect upon the public role intellectuals can play to advance the cause of freedom; he also unveils the pragmatic side of the “prophetic history” whose birth he advances. This “prophetic history”, however, has another side to it that is directly related to the history of freedom and that cannot be written merely by resorting to a teleological account of nature, but rather also requires a specific hermeneutic of historical signs.

6. Hermeneutic of historical signs

In An Old Question Raised Again, Kant once more takes up the question of human progress, elaborating the notion of a “prophetic history” of humanity in more detail. Specifically, he says that such a “history” is possible “if the diviner himself creates and contrives the events which he announces in advance” (SF, AA 07:80.1-2). To illustrate this idea, he mentions the examples of the Jewish prophets and suggests that politicians also try to play the same role because, by advancing certain intentions, they contribute their share to the realization of those very intentions: “So far as their influence extends, our politicians do precisely the same thing and are just as lucky in their prophecies…” (SF, AA 07:80.14-15). Implicit in those words is the idea that the discourses we introduce into the public sphere pragmatically contribute to the realization of certain purposes. As mentioned above, this is also the case of any account of history; because of its effect upon human agents, things may evolve very differently depending on whether we advance a catastrophist discourse (terroristische Vorstellungsart, in Kant’s own words), a eudaemonist discourse (chiliasm), or “stagnation in matters of morality” (abderistism).

At any rate, Kant thinks that the question at stake—whether the human race is constantly improving—cannot be resolved by a direct resort to experience “for we are dealing with beings
that act freely, to whom, it is true, what they ought to do may be dictated in advance, but of whom it may not be predicted what they will do” (SF, AA 07:83.12-15) and whose behaviour is marked by inconstancy. Could perhaps this inconvenience be solved by adopting a different perspective? To a certain extent, Kant pursues this strategy in *Idea for a Universal History* where, drawing on a significant analogy between a “scientific” approach to human affairs and the procedure of natural sciences, he suggests adopting the perspective of nature. On this occasion, he elaborates the same idea with more detail, explicitly taking the Copernican turn as a model (SF, AA 07:83.25). However, unlike the approach taken in *Idea*, he now seems more aware of the difficulties involved in adopting the perspective of Providence, the only position that would permit us to predict the *history of freedom*:

But, and this is precisely the misfortune, we are not capable of placing ourselves in this position when it is a question of the prediction of free actions. For that would be the standpoint of Providence which is situated beyond all human wisdom, and which likewise extends to the free actions of man; these actions, of course, man can see, but not foresee with certitude (for the divine eye there is no distinction in this matter): because, in the final analysis, man requires coherency according to natural laws, but with respect to his future free actions he must dispense with this guidance or direction (SF, AA 07:83.30-84.4).

While in *Idea* Kant bases his general approach to history solely on the concept of a teleological nature that cannot leave undeveloped human natural capacities and in *Speculative Beginnings* he rests upon the constancy of nature to sketch the origins of human history, in *An Old Question Raised Again* he explicitly deals with the history of freedom, along the lines already advanced in *Speculative Beginnings*: “the history of nature... begins with good, for it is God’s work; the history of freedom begins with badness, for it is man’s work” (MAM, AA 08:115.32-34). Now, Kant thinks that, given the “mixture of good and evil” found in human predisposition, it is difficult to predict with certainty whether human beings, of themselves, are willing to contribute to that end. A mere change in their point of view will not do the job. Therefore, while asserting that the problem of progress cannot be solved by directly resorting to experience, he nevertheless affirms that it should *start* from experience, meaning that we need to discover some sign that, when characterizing humanity, authorizes us to give more weight to good than to evil:

There must be some experience in the human race which, as an event, points to the disposition and capacity of the human race to be the cause of its own advance toward the better, and (since this should be the act of a being endowed with freedom), toward the human race as being the author of this advance (SF, AA 07:84.13-17).

Kant makes clear that in order to judge whether a particular event is significant for human disposition itself to cause its own progress, we need to focus not only on the event as such, but also on the accompanying circumstances, which, along with said disposition, made it possible. The important thing, however, is not the event as such, but rather the meaning it conveys to the philosophical eye. Indeed, the event should not be taken

as the cause of history, but only as an intimation, a *historical sign* (*signum rememorativum, demonstrativum, prognostikon*) demonstrating the tendency of the human race viewed in its entirety,
that is, seen not as (a sum of) individuals (for that would yield an interminable enumeration and computation), but rather as divided into nations and states (as it is encountered on earth) (SF, AA 07: 84.29-35).

The cosmopolitan character of Kant’s approach to history comes again to the fore because it is narrowly linked to moral character. Yet, what kind of event, because it unveils humanity’s moral disposition, could be taken as a sign of moral progress? According to Kant, this event need not be anything “momentous” or “magic”:

It is simply the mode of thinking of the spectators which reveals itself publicly in this game of great revolutions, and manifests such a universal yet disinterested sympathy for the players on one side against those on the other, even at the risk that this partiality could become very disadvantageous for them if discovered. Owing to its universality, this mode of thinking demonstrates a character of the human race at large and all at once; owing to its disinterestedness, a moral character of humanity, at least in its predisposition, a character which not only permits people to hope for progress toward the better, but is already itself progress in so far as its capacity is sufficient for the present (SF, AA 07: 85.9-18).

The enthusiastic and sympathetic reaction of contemporaries to the French Revolution, more than the revolution as such, captured Kant’s attention as a hopeful sign for human progress, in spite of all appearances. He takes that reaction as a particular sign of “a moral cause inserting itself in history”. Kant asserts that this event’s occurrence justifies the prophetic history of humanity along the lines he depicts, no matter if the revolution as such goes wrong (SF, AA 07: 88. 20 ff).

**ABSTRACT:** This essay intends to show how Kant’s approach to history paves the way for his philosophy of history. In order to do so, I will first draw on some texts included in the transcripts of Kant’s *Logic Lectures* to articulate his views on history. I will then argue that Kant’s philosophy of history constitutes his particular way of making sense of the contingency proper to historical knowledge in light of the interests of reason.

**KEYWORDS:** Historical sciences – geography – polyhistory – narrative - moral history.
REFERENCES


Notes

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2 Thus, as Christoph Wild notes, even neokantians such as Rickert or Windelband thought it necessary to go beyond Kant in order to develop a critical approach to history. In addition, Wild himself thinks that Kant's remarks about history were just a part of his practical philosophy. See WILD (1970, p. 260-275).


I will refer to the handwritten notes that Kant gave to Jäsche are on AA 16; the manual is on AA 9.

8 This is actually the problem that William J. Booth considers central in Kant’s philosophy of history: “How ought we to view history, and what compels us to adopt a viewpoint at all? For history, as Kant frequently comments, is like a play, a theatrical spectacle—a tragedy, a comedy, or both. But what a curious sort of play! In it we are at once actors, authors and spectators”. Booth, W. J. (1983, p. 56).

9 I. Kant, Lectures on Logic (1992, p. xvii). The information on the logic lectures can be found at the following website: http://www.manchester.edu/kant/notes/notesLogic.htm

10 I refer to the Blumberg and the Philippi Logic, which are based on Kant’s lectures in the early 1770’s; the Politiz, the Hecschel and the Vienna Logic are from the 1780’s; and the Busolt and Dobna-Wundlacken Logic are from 1789 and the 1790s. More information on the logic lectures can be found at the following website: http://www.manchester.edu/kant/notes/notesLogic.htm


12 “Alle geleherte Schriften sind entweder historische oder dogmatische. Eine Schrift kann historisch sein sowohl der Materie nach wenn sie etwas wirklich geschehenes oder eine Kenntniss vom Individuo ist, als auch der Form nach. Die Form heisst historisch die nicht rational ist; wo ich nicht durch allgemeine Erkenntniss der Gründe was herleite”. V-Lo Philippi, AA 24.1: 490.28-32.


14 Muglioni (2011, p. 82-83).


18 PG, AA 09: 156.20.


22 See PG, AA 09: 164-165, where Kant briefly explains the meaning of mathematical geography, moral geography, political geography, mercantile geography and theological geography.
24 See also: “Alles was da geschieht wird betrachtet in Verbindung mit Raum ud Zeit. Wenn man das was da geschieht betrachtet, in sofern es zu verschiedener Zeit ist, so heisst da Historie: sofern es zu gleicher Zeit ist, so gehört is Feld der Geographie”. V-Lo Philippi, AA 24.1:491.9-12.

25 See also V-Lo Philippi, AA 24.1: 491-2.


28 Kant makes this distinction in his Speculative Beginnings of Human History. For an interesting account of the significance of freedom in this context, see Fackenheim (1956/57, p. 389): “Kant establishes history as a special sphere by showing two things: that freedom can appear and develop; and that there is cultural as well as moral freedom”.

29 Medicus attempts to argue in this direction. See Medicus (1902, p. 10-12).


32 "Man kann die Dinge der Welt insofern sie zu gleicher Zeit geschehen hervorzählen; dann gehört das zur natürlichen oder physischen Geographie. Man kann erzählen was zu verschiedenen Zeiten in der Natur sich zugetrage: dann heisst dies Naturgeschichte. … Denn die Naturgeschichte ist um nichts jünger als die Welt selbst, wir können aber für die Sicherheit unserer Nachrichten nicht einmal seit Entstehung der Schreibkunst bürgen”. PG, AA 09:161.15-18.

33 "If the name natural history that has been adopted for the description of nature is to remain in use, then one can call that which it literally means, namely a representation of the ancient condition of the earth –about which, even though there is no hope for certainty, there is reasonable ground for making conjectures—the archaeology of nature, in contrast to that of art. To the former belong fossils, just as to the latter belong carved stones, etc. For since we are really constantly if also, as is fitting, slowly working on such archaeology (under the name of a theory of the earth), this name would not be given to a merely imaginary branch of research into nature, but to one to which nature itself invites and summons us”. KU, AA 05:428. 28-37.


36 “The two elements in Kant’s Copernican revolution both involve the spectator and his relation to the object: the first part of this revolution shows that experience is not possible without synthesis, i.e., a spontaneous power of the mind, and that therefore the given and the mind or spectator are co-equal ingredients of experience. The second part of Kant’s revolution shows that the same event can be viewed now as a phenomenon necessitated by other causes in nature, now as something with a free cause”. Booth (1983, p. 57).

37 See KAULBACH (1965/66, p. 433; p. 442).

38 For a discussion of the narrative form of Kant’s philosophical history as an alternative account to the narrative form of the novel, see Williams (2013).

39 “Die Vernunft nämlich sieht sich durch solche Zufälligkeit, die in Geschichte und Erfahrung auftritt, herausforderter: sie will auch diesem ihr fremden Bereich gegenüber das ihr lebensnotwendige Prinzip der Einheit durchsetzen und sucht diese Einheit dort, wo sie ihr au einer niedrigeren Stufe versagt worden ist, auf einem höheren Stand zu gewinnen”. KAULBACH (1965/66, p. 432).

40 “Man muss unterscheiden doctrin und discipline. Jede Institution kann negative sein d.h. vor Irrtümere bewahren, den ist sie discipline, oder positive d.h. Erkenntnisse erweitern, denn ist sie doctrin. – Kritik ist das, was vorhergeht ehe ich Erkenntnisse
of philology, which aims in the first instance at the cultivation of taste. If we separate the mere philologist from the humanist,
eloquence, poetry, wide reading in the classical authors, etc. All these humanistic cognitions can be reckoned in the practical part
then, concern instruction in what serves the cultivation of taste, in conformity with the models of the ancients. This includes, e.g.,
which rubs off coarseness ad furthers the communicability and urbanity in which humanity consists. The humaniora,
established by the ancients, and the Anrufung der Zeugen is in Anschung des Empirischen ganz nothwendig, weil wir nicht alles selbst erfahren können”. V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24.2: 562.48-30.
42 ”Ein Augenzeuge ist der Seine eigene Erfahrung hat, ein Hörenzeuge aber der andrer Zeugniss hat. Dieser hat nur eine
mittelbare Glaubwürdigkeit. In der Reihe der subordinierten Zeugnisse nimmt die historische Glaubwürdigkeit ab; in der Reihe der
koordinierten Zeuge nimmt sie zu. Die Reihe der koordinierten Zeugnisse heisst das öffentliche Gerüchte, der subordinierte Zeugnisse
hingegen eine mündliche Ueberlieferung. Wenn in den koordinierten Zeugnissen der Augenzeuge unbekannt ist, so heisst eine
43 ”Alle Citationes haben eine historische Glauben und die Anrufung der Zeugen ist in Anschung des Empirischen ganz nothwendig,
44 As a matter of fact, in the Pölitz Logic he divides certainty into ”empirische” and ”apodiktisch” certainty. See V-Lo/Pölitz 24.2: 560.19.
45 V-Lo Philippi, AA 24.1: 483.36.
46 Also in the Philosophy Logic: ”In historischen Wissenschaften hat man zwei Methoden, die chronologische und die geographische.
Allein sind zu vereinbaren. Die letztere scheint mir vorzüglich zu sein als die erste, ob man gleich sich derselben nicht bedienen.
In allen zusammenhängenden Erkenntnissen muss man eher das Ganze als seine Theile, und von den Theilen eher die grossen als
47 ”Aber was war früher da, Geschichte oder Geographie? Die letztere liegt der ersterm zum Grunde, denn die Begebenheiten
müssen sich doch auf etwas beziehen. Die Geschichte ist in einem unablässigen Fortgange; aber auch die Dinge verändern sich und
geben zu gewisse Zeiten eine ganz andre Geographie. Die Geographie also ist das Substrat. Haben wir nun eine alte Geschichte,
so müssen wir natürlich auch eine alte Geographie haben”. PG, AA 09:163.4-10.
48 ”Jene trägt die Dinge der Welt vor nach ihrer Verbindung im Raum, diese nach ihrer Verbindung in der Zeit. Die erstere muss
der letztern zum Grund liegen”. V-Lo/Pölitz 24.2:600.29-31.
49 ”Der Mensch strebt von Natur nach Lehrgebäuden. Das Ideal oder Ganze geht vorher, und und nur im
Ganzen lasse sich die Theile denken”. V-Lo Philippi, AA 24.1: 399.36-38.
50 This is related to Kant's use of statistics: ”L'importance accordée à la méthode statistique indique le souci d'une technique
d'observation globale, linéaire, généralisatrice, celle d'un spectateur 'objectif', en tant qu'extérieur. Mais Kant s'efforce plutôt d'allier
la méthode statistique à la méthode cosmopolitique”. CASTILLO (1990, p. 72).
51 ”Der Horizont der menschlichen Erkenntniss ist der Umfang der Erkenntnisse die der menschliche Vollkommenheit
angemessen sind (…) Wenn die Grenzen der Erkenntniss mit den Grenzen der Vollkommenheit congruiren; so ist der Bezirk
de sie einschliessen der für Menschen bestimmte Horizont”. V-Lo Philippi, AA 24.1: 274. See also V-Lo/Pölitz 24.2: 521.7-15.
52 ”Der Horizont der historischen Erkenntnisse ist nicht möglich genau zu bestimmen, wiewol gewissermassen. Was von neuem
hinzucommt, das vergisst sich vom Alten… Der Mensch kann nicht alles fassen. Die Historie schafft nur Gegenstände zur rationalen
53 ”A philosopher is not a learned man; rather, he looks at what the value of learnedness finally is. He must possess learnedness,
54 ”Das historisches Wissen ohne bestimmte Gränzen ist Polyhistorie”. V-Lo/Pölitz 24.2, 522.35.
55 See also V-Lo/ Philippi, AA 24.1:493.6-14.
57 V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24.2:818.18 "Philology is the complex of all instruments of learnedness. The philologist is the connoisseur of
the tools of learnedness, the humanist is the connoisseur of the cultivation of taste. Humanity is always at the same time popular.
Only dead languages can become models of taste, not living ones, for the latter simply change too often, and words and whose
meaning was noble have a lower meaning. To have lasting taste, one must study the ancients. If the ancients were to be lost, one has
to fear the spread of barbarism”. V-Lo/Dohna, 24.2:714-5.34-715.3. See the same ideas in the Jäsche Logic: ”One part of philology
is constituted by the humaniora, by which is understood acquaintance with the ancients, which furthers the unification of science
with taste, which rubs off coarseness ad furthers the communicability and urbanity in which humanity consists. The humaniora,
then, concern instruction in what serves the cultivation of taste, in conformity with the models of the ancients. This includes, e.g.,
eloquence, poetry, wide reading in the classical authors, etc. All these humanistic cognitions can be reckoned in the practical part
of philology, which aims in the first instance at the cultivation of taste. If we separate the mere philologist from the humanist,
however, the two would differ from one another in that the former seeks the tools of learnedness among the ancients, the latter the tools for the cultivation of taste. The belletrist, or bel sprit, is a humanist according to contemporary models in living languages. He is not learned, then, for only dead languages are now learned languages, but is rather a mere dilettante in cognitions of taste in accordance with fashion, with no need for the ancients. We could call him one who apes the humanist. The polyhistor must, as philologist, be a linguist and a literator, and as a humanist a classicist ad expositor of the classics. As philologist he is cultivated, as humanist civilized”. Log, AA 09:45.33-46.17.

58 In Kant’s view, “a linguist is one who studies ancient languages with critique, and if he chooses them as models of taste, then he is a humanist. Only the ancients will always remain models of genuine taste, because their languages are dead languages. Now the literator is one who can name many books of the ancients, as to their editions, their authors. He who is acquainted with many books is a literator”. V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 818.20-24.


60 “The culture of skill is certainly the foremost subjective condition of aptitude for the promotion of ends in general”. KU, AA 05: 431.37.


62 “Sentiment and spirit belong to genius. The power of judgment and taste do not produce anything, but only administer either in relation to the object or to each other. What corresponds with the subjective laws of the understanding has spirit. What enlivens belongs to sentiment and spirit; what preserves and protects, to the power of judgment and taste. Genius is architectonic. It creates. The power of judgment and taste administer”. R AA 16:136.7-15; n. 1847.


65 See especially paragraphs 82-84; KU, AA 05: 425-436. Attempting a unitary reading of the third Critique, which makes sense of the role biology plays and its relevance for a philosophy of history, Fackenheim writes (1956/57, p. 393): “According to Kant, the teleological concept, as the biologist must use it, lacks theoretical justification. Hence it is merely a heuristic, not an explanatory principle. But though we cannot connect it with the supersensible root of nature and morality, Kant clearly believes that it is connected with that root. Consequently, he can regard organic nature as evidence of a sort—evidence which is, to be sure, theoretically insufficient and morally unnecessary—of what he can loosely call providence. Regarding it in this light, he can ask whether it is reasonable to assume purposiveness in some parts of nature, but none in nature as a whole. In other words, he can connect biological with moral purposiveness. And he must then concentrate on that sphere which alone can directly link nature as a whole with morality, thus giving it value. That sphere is history. Thus a teleological biology can encourage a teleological history”.

66 Other texts which insist upon the same principle: “… as a class of rational beings—each member of which dies, while the species is immortal— it is destined to develop its capacities to perfection”. Idea, 20.

67 For a discussion of this assumption see Ameriks (2012, p. 210-218).


69 As Booth rightly points out, “it is man’s capacities, his culture and civilization that are advanced by history, and not his morality. The distinction between culture and morality is crucial for understanding the limits of history, even a priori history”. Booth (1983: p. 65). I have developed this idea in González (2011). By contrast, Vanhaute’s talk of “the historical development of mankind” as an “unavoidable process of moralization” (2011, p. 157) is misleading.

70 See Kaulbach (1965/66, p. 435-437) comments on Kant’s Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (1755).


72 “It would be a misunderstanding of my point of view to believe that I want this idea of a world history that is to a certain extent led by an a priori guiding thread to take the place of history as such, whose composition is wholly empirical. This idea is only a reflection of what a philosophical mind (which must above all be well versed in history) could attempt to do from another perspective. Besides, the otherwise laudable detail with which men now record the history of their times naturally causes everyone concern as to how after several centuries our distant descendants will come to grips with the burden of history that we shall leave to them”. IaG, AA 08: 30. 29-31.1

73 “Teleology, in the case of history, is moral teleology, which is to say that the end which all must subserve is moral freedom. And this may well seem to pose a fatal dilemma. Either moral freedom is independent of teleologico-mechanical necessity, in which case the connection between nature and morality breaks down; or else freedom is necessitated, in which case it is no longer freedom. In either case nature (and history) are mere facts without value. Whether this dilemma is indeed fatal depends on whether mechanism, teleology and moral freedom can all be brought together”. Fackenheim (1956/57, p. 394).
74 See González (2011).


76 This is in tune with Booth’s insight: “The facts themselves are less important than whether the way we see them produces in us moral cowardice, a comforting hope or a recognition of our moral superiority to their horrors”. Booth (1983, p. 56).

77 See Booth, “Reason and history: Kant’s other Copernican Revolution” (1983, p. 56-71). Unlike Booth, I don’t think that both approaches—the “productive prophecy” and the change of viewpoints—are mutually exclusive.

78 Muglioni stresses this point in his interpretation of that passage. See Muglioni (2001, p. 133-135).

79 The Anthropology conveys a similar idea: “The human species should and can create his own good fortune. That he will do so, however, cannot be determined a priori from what is known to us about man’s natural tendencies. It can be determined only from experience and history, with expectations as well-founded as necessary, that we should not despair about our species’ progress toward the better, but instead further (each to his best ability) with all good sense and moral inspiration the approach to this goal” (Anth, AA 07: 328.27-329.6).