ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE THE CONCEPT OF BODY INTO THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

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1. THE ATTEMPT

According to the CPR our body plays no role in the objective cognition of the world. It doesn’t appear in the Transcendental Aesthetic, not even in the receptivity, although Kant describes sensibility as the capacity «to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects» (CPR A 19/B 33), and rightly so, because the form of this transcendental sensibility is not the five senses of our body that could be physically affected by the objects (A 28/B 44), but space and time, which already suggests that we are in a different sphere and method of thinking, such as the empirical. Our body is even less present in the Transcendental Analytic where it is dealt with the spontaneity of thinking and its forms (schemata, categories, principles). The transcendental subject does not need to identify with a body according to the CPR, it does, however, with the inner sense as our empirical I or soul. «I distinguish my own existence, that of a thinking being, from other things outside me (to which my body also belongs) – this is equally an analytic proposition; for other things are those that I think of as distinguished from me» (B 409). Thus, the body has no subjectivity, no interiority, it is an outer object among the other. Through the transcendental Apperception, I know that I am, and I know what I am as an appearance solely through the inner sense (B 152-159; A 278, B 334); the own body doesn’t play any role here.

To find an identification of the I with the body, we must go to the doctrine of rights. There is only one right that is innate, original and equal for all people: freedom, independence, «the quality of the human being to be your own master (sui iuris)» (MM, AA 6: 237-238), so that he cannot use neither himself nor the others merely as means, but he should consider them always at the same time as end in itself. I belong to me; freedom is the inner Mine. The outer Mine and Yours, my property, are also in connection with freedom, but as means or thing; I
can alienate them, i.e. sell or give away. But I am forbidden to do the same with my own body and the bodies of others; it is not allowed to make me or the others slaves or impose servitude. Therefore, a human being is his own master (sui iuris), but not owner of himself (sui dominus) (about themselves freely dispose) even less of others (MM, AA 6: 270). So my body is part of my inner and not of my acquired right and it has a direct relationship to freedom - at least to the outer freedom. But what would be freedom without this outer expression and appearance since it is not a transcendental substance that could be without world?

I would like to try to offer proof that, if we think according to the doctrine and the transcendental method of the CPR consistently and with a focused interpretation, i.e., if we think this issue through from this point of view, we can realize that the synthetic identification of the transcendental subject with a body is also a necessary element for the objective cognition of the world in the theoretical field. This element was not taken into account in the reflection of the Critique, it remains not thought in the thought. It is to be rescued for the possibility and understanding of the third Analogy of experience.

2. THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEA OF “REFUTATION OF IDEALISM”

For this attempt we want to start from the “Refutation of Idealism” of the second edition of the CPR (B 274-279). This excellent piece teaches us how we can think transcendentally in philosophy. This passage conveys the proof against Descartes’s view that the reality or existence of the external world is just as certain as the inner experience of the subject.

A similar argument can be found in the first edition of the CPR in the fourth Paralogism (A 366-380), which discusses the relationship of the soul (of the inner sense) to any objects in the space. Kant follows again the Table of Categories as a guide in the Paralogisms. The fourth Paralogism consequently refers to the category of actuality or existence, to the second category of modality. The question is how and why we know that the spatial objects of outer sense really exist. In Descartes and his successors, the I is understood as a substance closed in itself, identified only with the thinking and the inner sense. As a result, we could not immediately intuit the existence and reality of spatial things, but only infer them from their “commercium” or interaction (A 345/B 403) with the soul, i.e. through the category of causality. But as Hume pointed out, such a conclusion reached on the basis of a causal relationship is very uncertain, inter alia because an effect might arise from various causes. «Thus the existence of all objects of outer sense is doubtful» (A 367). This conclusion is compelled by transcendental realism because for him, spatial objects are things in itself and entirely independent from the subject, i.e. since there is not immediacy between the subject and the external objects, no direct intuition; between both, the subject and the object, interposes the representation, the sensation. Due to the fundamental splitting, this formulation of the question leads easily to a skepticism about the external world (Hume), or to a denial of the reality of the world, as it happens with the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley.

But this is different in transcendental idealism. The empirical actuality of the spatial world is asserted by it, because it isn't totally independent from the transcendental subject.
and this is thought not as a substance, not as real, but as an ideal action that opens the field of the cognition. For the transcendental I, the spatial world is also an appearance, i.e. it is dependent on the interpretative and inquiring activity of this subject (transcendental idealism), although nature remains also independent in its answers (empirical realism). It could be that the world never positively fulfills the expectations of the a priori forms of the objectivity, but then our consciousness wouldn’t be possible. But given that we are conscious, we can state that the world is real in the way the a priori forms of the objective cognition require, i.e. we have the right to claim, «the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience» (A 158/B 197). And so, spatial objects are not actually “external” or independent from the transcendental subject; this is something that the ordinary and pre-critical thinking doesn’t see. The expression “outside us” (außer uns) is therefore ambiguous, noticed Kant, «since it sometimes signifies something that, as a thing in it-self, exists distinct from us and sometimes merely something that belongs to outer appearance» (A 373). The first perspective or meaning is transcendental, it refers to the reality that cannot be acquired by means of our objective cognition because it has a different way of being, for example our freedom. In the second denotation, however, the term refers to the spatial objects of our experience: this table, this tree, that bird, etc., and they are called “outer” (äußere), because in space everything is external (partes extra partes) to everything (A 370); but that which is a thing-in-itself from the empirical perspective of the common consciousness, is an appearance from the transcendental. Thus there are also two meanings of “We” or “I”, the empirical and the transcendental subject, and two kinds of appearance or cognitive representation, that is, from the inner and the outer sense. In contrast to our empiricist habit, the word “representation” (Vorstellung) must be understood not limited to the inner sense. So is our immediate intuition of both «at the same time a sufficient proof of their actuality (Wirklichkeit)» (A 371). Sensation and perception immediately indicate and prove an actuality in two kinds of sensible intuition, and therefore something real in the space as well (A 373-377).

However, this line of argument, present in the fourth Paralogism of the first edition of the CPR, is still deficient. For us, the inner sensation alone is not sufficient to decide about the outer actuality: it could be a dream or a hallucination. From the CPR we know that sensation shows reality (category of quality), but to be able to affirm the external objective actuality of something, we also need to use the categories of relation, which are involved in the categories of modality. The first three types of categories (quantity, quality and relation) themselves form only the appearances; following from, and in connection with them, the modal category of actuality puts the appearance in front of the transcendental subject as “object” (Gegen-stand), as “being-in-front” or “thrown-in-front”, as outside or different from the subject as pure possibility (first category of modality) or capacity of cognition. Based on the categories of quantity and quality, the appearances are thought of in their form and material content, and their relationship to each other is determined through the categories of relation. Only then, the appearances are opposed to the subjective as objective thanks to the categories of modality (A 219/B 266). The argument of the second edition of the CPR in the passage of “Refutation of Idealism” proceeds differently than the first edition, and is based just on the
categories of relation and their respective Analogies of experience. This second line of argument will be analysed below.

The text mentioned is no longer discussed in the transcendental dialectic, but in the transcendental analytic of principles, in the second postulate of empirical thinking, that corresponds to the category of actuality or existence. This shift could be attributed to the accusation of idealism, that was raised against the first edition of the CPR, according to which, it necessarily leads to doubt the actuality of the outer world, and even to the denial of it. Kant was (and still often is, for instance by Heidegger) interpreted in a Cartesian perspective whereby the I, the cogito, and so our cognitive actions or their elements, are first closed in themselves, in a kind of Platonic cave, and then it is necessary for it after to step out from itself into the outer world. But in this case, it would be too late and the spatial world (res extensa) would be left hidden behind a wall of pure subjective representations, where it would be only guessed and doubted or led back to a merely inner perception. Here, Kant is concerned with delivering proof that what happens is just the opposite — the external experience is immediate, and the doing of the I consists of coming back to itself, to the inner experience, something similar to the “de-distancing” (Ent-fernung) of the Dasein by Heidegger (Being and Time § 23). However, this movement is made possible, because the I was already in itself, but as a transcendental apperception or self-consciousness, and not as substance or closed reality, but as an open ideal action, which is even conscious of itself, a spontaneous ideal transparency that makes cognition and knowledge possible.

In the second Postulate of empirical thinking it is said that the reality (quality, Realität) «can only pertain to sensation, as the matter of experience» (A 223/B 270), to an immediate sensation, in whose absence we must grasp the category of the negation. But the category of actuality (modality) and their corresponding Postulate does not necessarily require a present sensation of the object itself, the «connection with some actual perception in accordance with the analogies of experience, which exhibit all real connection in an experience in general» (A 225/B 272) is enough. So we can affirm the actuality of Tokyo, although we don't see it in this moment, or we can claim about the past actuality of dinosaurs on the basis of traces they left by using the Analogies of experience and the empirical laws and connections, even though we don't receive any immediate sensation of themselves today. The sensation is enough for the reality, but actuality includes also the relation and the Analogies of experience. For the actuality we must activate the first three kinds of categories: quantity, quality and relation, notwithstanding that actuality is an original action of the knowing subject and therefore a category. There, the “Refutation of idealism” becomes more efficient in order to overcome the traditional wrong way to indirectly prove the existence of the world and of outer objects by using the causality.

The “Refutation” starts from the inner experience, from the fact that I am conscious of my existence as determined in time, therefore from the inner sense. This consciousness of the own determined existence is accepted by everybody, even the skeptics, and that is why it is for Kant the starting point for proving that the inner experience is dependent on its determinacy on the outer experience, which appears as a real and immediate experience. How can this
dependency be explained? Kant tries to prove it by means of the first Analogy of experience and their schemata. The schema of substance is the persistence of the real in time, says Kant in the Schematism chapter, «and in it alone can the succession and simultaneity of appearances be determined in regard to time» (A 144/B 183). The change of accidents is grasped on the basis of persistence. And so says the first Analogy of the experience: «All appearances contain that which persists (substance) as the object itself, and that which can change as its mere determination, i.e., a way in which the object exists» (A 182). The persistent or substance of the appearance, i.e. the real in it, lasts and remains as substrate of its changes (B 225). But the subjective apprehension of the empirical manifold through the imagination is always successive, changing. Therefore, it would be impossible for us to decide only through this inner apprehension whether this manifold is objectively either simultaneous or successive. For this objective determination of the time we need to resort to something persistent, without which any continuity of succession and simultaneity, any transition from one state to the other, and thus also the synthetic unity and connection of the only experience would be suspended and not perceived. The explanation of the first Analogy about the persistence and change goes up to here (A 182-189/B 225-232). The persistent is connected only with the time and not with the space in the Schematism as well as in the first Analogy: «The persistent gives general expression to time as the constant correlate of all existence of appearances, all change and all accompaniment» (A 183/B 226), it is time mode, pure temporality. The (transcendental) time persists and only the appearances change in time. But this time, as an infinite (without ending) form of sensibility, may not be perceived because we can only perceive something finite through the power of our imagination. Therefore, for this function (of determining the objective time mode of the appearances) we must take a relative persistent in the appearances, which in that case plays the role of substance in them (A 182-183; B 224-226).

In the “Refutation of idealism”, the persistent has instead to do with the outer objects and with the space, because it must be outside of the internal experience. This is the new and interesting addition. The line of argumentation starts from the consciousness of my existence as set in time, as living at this particular time. How can I reach this consciousness? What are the conditions that make it possible? Thanks to the transcendental apperception and its spontaneity, I am myself conscious, because this apperception is an original and pure self-consciousness. But only with this transcendental self-consciousness I am conscious about the fact that I am, but not what I am, either as an objective finite appearance or as a real free being (B 157-158), since his transcendental self-consciousness is not a real but an ideal transcendental-logical action. As a finite being of the world (not as a free being, that is here left aside) I appear to myself in my inner sense, says Kant (B 152-159). Three elements are necessary for this empirical consciousness:

Firstly, the transcendental apperception, which makes possible all consciousness.

Secondly, a self-affection by which this spontaneity (called by Kant now understanding), in the form of transcendental imagination and its synthesis, (a) shapes a particular synthesis through the time, a certain connection of the temporal manifold (schemata); (b) the subjective spontaneity limits itself to a determined sensible manifold, i.e., draws attention to it: now I
pay attention to this part of the world (for instance, to this computer) and that is why I have
this representations and not others as the content of my inner sense (B 152-159); and (c) it
determines every manifold as objective by means of the schemata in its specific time modes, i.e.
in its persistence or succession or simultaneity.

Thirdly, a passivity, an “external affection”, which makes possible the experience of the
objective world.

By the self-transparency of the transcendental apperception I am conscious that I am,
and due to its spontaneity I know that my existence is not a mere appearance. But through
that alone, I still don’t obtain any determination of my existence and I don’t cognize what I
am (B 157, 278, 422-423 note). It is only in the inner sense that I find the objective appearing
content of my existence. But in the inner sense a constant flow of representations, sensations,
affects, feelings, etc. reigns. Merely through the inner sense I don’t get to explain the temporal
determination of my existence, because without comparing and contrasting with something
permanent (a) I cannot grasp the flowing of the inner sense as such, (b) (as we will see) I cannot
determine the different manifolds of my existence in their specific time modes (persistence,
succession, simultaneity), (c) and I cannot cognize when and in which objective time each
inner manifold happens. As explained, this requires something persistent and simultaneous,
to which every inner representation is related. In addition, this persistent should be an outer
appearance in space, «since space alone persistently determines, while time, however, and thus
everything that is in inner sense constantly flows» (B 291). A mediate consciousness of spatial
things, i.e. an inner representation of these outer appearances that doesn’t persist (Hume
had already noticed this) but that flows constantly and doesn’t bring any contrast, is then
also insufficient to determine objectively my existence in time. An immediate perception, an
immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside myself is needed. We therefore
cognize them, not through a conclusion or reasoning but, immediately, by an intuition. Merely
by an interaction with them, can I temporarily determine my existence and date, not only my
inner representations and feelings, but also my actions or my birth. This therefore means that
«the mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence
of objects in space outside me» (B 275). The outer experience as such is not mediate but
immediate and is not inferred through the inner sense and its representations, as claimed by the
empirical and psychological idealist, because it is only in this way that we can transcendentally
explain «not the consciousness of our own existence», since this is based on pure apperception,
«but its determination in time» (B 277), which is in this respect mediate.

3. The new role of space

Persistence of the real in time is the schema of the category of substance (A 144/B
183). In the chapter on the schematism (A 137/B 176 ff.) we find only the application
of the categories to the time - the space is here completely missing. The pure concepts of
understanding don’t have any corresponding case under the empirical intuitions and therefore
any immediate application to them; the categories cannot be intuited empirically. So a third
element, an intermediary, is necessary for the application of the categories to the appearances, and this intermediary is the transcendental schema. These schemata are the temporal meanings of the categories as translation of their logical meaning – and here the space don’t have any role. A transcendental schema is a pure determination of time in accordance to the category, a pure action of the transcendental imagination. Since it is an action ruled by the category, it belongs to the spontaneity. Since the schemata are determinations of time, they serve to order all appearances objectively, because time is the form of every representation of the empirical manifold. The categories as concepts have a logical meaning which is broader and not limited to the form of sensibility. Therefore, the schema restricts the concept of understanding to time and to the temporal in its use; without this limitation the categories would be empty concepts without any objective meanings.

But why is only time and not space considered here? The explanation lies in the transcendental Aesthetic. There is said space is the pure form of the outer sense and of the outer objects, while time is the pure form of the inner sense. «Time can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us» (A 23/B 37). Space makes an outer intuition of objects that are separated from each other possible (*parte extra partes*) and is limited to outer appearances. Time, for its part, «is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state. For time cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it belongs neither to a shape nor to a position, etc., on the contrary, it determines the relation of representations in our inner state» (A 33/B 49-50). A formal condition of outer appearances is also time, but as a mediate, because in the end they belong, as determination of the mind, to the inner state. «So time is an a priori condition of all appearance in general, and indeed the immediate condition of the inner intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediate condition of outer appearances» (A 34/B 50). That is why schematism should be aimed only at time, because only time covers all empirical appearances as form of sensibility.

This relation changes in the “Refutation of Idealism”. The schema of the substance, the persistence just as time mode is, according to the “Refutation”, not possible without space. As a result, space is considered necessary for the objective meaning of the category of substance, since it is only in space that is possible for something to persist. «We do not even have anything persistent on which we could base the concept of a substance, as intuition, except merely matter» (B 278), which belongs to the outer world. But, because the persistence is, according to Kant, the basis for other modes of time, we can conclude that space is a necessary element for the objective meanings of the other categories of relation, for «we can perceive all time-determination only through the change in outer relations (motion) relative to that which persists in space (e.g., the motion of the sun with regard to the objects on the earth)» (B 277-278). The persistent appearance is therefore spatial and temporal, neither merely spatial nor purely temporal, and the same is true to the other categories of relation.

Significant references to this change appear in the “General Note on the System of Principles” (B 288 ff.) that Kant added in the second edition of the KrV. His discovery thanks to the “Refutation” still feels very fresh, car this “Note” arises as a subsequent comment or reflection concerning its fundamental idea and its consequences (B 293). «It is even more
remarkable, however, that in order to understand the possibility of things in accordance with the categories, and thus to establish the objective reality of the latter, we do not merely need intuitions, but always outer intuitions» (B 291).

In the case of the substance we need space, as Kant said here, because something can only be persistent in it. The same happens with the causality, the objective validity which requires changes in space, «all alteration presupposes something that persists in intuition, even in order merely to be perceived as alteration, but there is no persistent intuition to be found in inner sense» (B 292). What (relatively) persists in the appearance is placed in the ground as substance, the variable as accident\(^{16}\), and the category of causality is the rule that objectively allows us to make these changes, not only in time, but also in space (that may now be added) to order and to recognize.

This requirement of space for the objective meaning of the categories appears even clearer in the interaction, the third category of relation, this includes in itself the actions of the other two categories of relation, furthermore, it adds the simultaneity which need also space. Thanks to this third category we objectify all phenomena in a truly interacting community and thus we order them in space and in time and according to the empirical laws. Therefore, the understanding and its concepts, i.e. the comprehending subject, require a scheme in which space should be considered in order to grasp these objects as simultaneous, but separated, and in mutual interaction, «for this [the space] already contains in itself a priori formal outer relations as conditions of the possibility of the real (in effect and counter effect, thus in community)» (B 293). As a result, we must represent the empirical substances in space, in the outer intuition. Otherwise, we would need a God as mediator, such as Leibniz in his pre-established harmony.

And that happens not only in the categories of relation, but also in the two first types of categories, asserts Kant now; the sensible quantity and quality are both, spatial as well temporal. «The possibility of things as magnitudes, and thus the objective reality of the category of magnitude» - here, under “magnitude” we must understand the extensive (quantity) as well as the intensive magnitude (quality) - «can also be exhibited only in outer intuition, and that by means of that alone it can subsequently be applied to inner sense» (B 293). Unfortunately, Kant doesn’t explain this question further, «in order to avoid being long-winded» (ibidem), he says.

It is obvious that the extensive magnitude requires not only time, but also space and, in fact, space is applied in the proof and in the explanation of the Axioms of intuition. The synthesis of the manifold of empirical intuitions, thanks to which this manifold is objectified, implies a certain synthesis of the a priori form of intuition, i.e. of space and time, «through which the representation of a determinate space or time are generated» (B 202). As pure forms of the sensibility they are indeterminate, but now they are delimited and determined, and can therefore be intuited objectively through the synthetic action of the imagination. «The appearances are all magnitudes, and indeed extensive magnitudes, since as intuitions in space or time they must be represented through the same synthesis as that through which space and time in general are determined» (B 203). Mathematics is based on this synthetic action of the productive imagination with regard to space and time (geometry and arithmetic). Imagination
here creates the number as a schema (A 142-143/B 182). I think, however, that the actual schema or procedure\textsuperscript{17} of the productive imagination, thanks to which «the manifold first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for a cognition to be made out of it» (A 77/B 102), here, in the categories of quantity, consists of drawing-lines. This successive but unifying action of the imagination makes the extensive magnitude of the appearance graspable, and makes an intuition of both space and time possible; it combines and limits (determines) a part of space and time\textsuperscript{18} as well as the shape or the extensive magnitude of the objects. Only the imagination is capable of keeping this concrete spatial and temporal manifold in a single unit.

Space and time are also necessary for the intensive magnitudes. The real in the appearance fulfills just the part of space and time, which were referred to and determined by the extensive magnitude. The intensive magnitude is their content, «the materials for some object in general (through which something existing in space or time is represented)» (B 207). The word “or” in the expression “in space or time”, which used here and in the explanation of the extensive magnitude, seems to indicate, however, that space is not applicable to all cases for the objectification of all appearances, but I will try to prove that this is not the case\textsuperscript{19}.

Finally, space plays a role in the categories of modality too, although Kant says nothing about it in his “General Note”. The transcendental actions in the categories of modality confront the transcendental subject with the object already formed by the other categories, the outer and the inner appearances, as an object (Gegen-stand) (A 219/B 266). The transcendental distinction lies in the difference between possibility (the subjective a priori framework) and actuality (the objective appearance) itself. The third category of modality, the necessity, is the synthetic combination of the first two, the understanding of the empirical necessity of an appearance according to objective laws. As a result, space is also always present in the modality, thus it has now become a necessary a priori element of the objectification in the three first types of categories that are included in the modality. Therefore, the objective meaning of these last categories should count also on space.

Thanks to the schemata, the categories are connected with the sensibility, at the same time they receive objective meaning and validity\textsuperscript{20}. However, it has been demonstrated that only time is not sufficient and also that space is unconditionally necessary. If this is so, if for all categories space is unconditionally required in order to get an objective use, then Kant, taking into account this discovery, should have once again rewritten the chapter about the schematism and reworked the schemata, not only as determinations of time, but also of space. Consequently, all\textsuperscript{21} appearances must be determined as spatial and temporal, otherwise the categories could not obtain their objective meaning, it can be proved that without a relation with space they don’t determine objectively any appearance, not even in the inner experience. That was made clear by the proof of the “Refutation of Idealism”. Or is the space of outer objects enough here, as it appears to be implied in the “Refutation” itself? I don’t think so. To now determine my empirical existence in time through something spatially persistent, i.e. through the other empirical substances or objects from the outer world, I (my empirical I) must be next to, and in simultaneous interaction with them according to the third Analogy of
experience; I must also be something corporal and different from them, a body in space next to them, occupying another place, therefore I must appear spatial and simultaneous, similar to the spatial and temporal persistent, in which certain empirical things or determinations are changing. If this is not the case, if it wouldn't give any empirical dynamic connection between me and the other spatial objects, no temporal determination of my existence, or objective cognition, would be possible.

That implies - although Kant himself doesn't draw this conclusion - that both outer and inner appearances have to be synthesized and objectivized by the imagination through their own spatial and temporal order to be distinguished. There is then a spatial and temporal order of outer appearances and another of the inner appearances, but both connected to each other, because all appearances must form only one experience; otherwise, we could neither orientate ourselves in space or in time, nor feel my sense as mine. If, on the contrary, we continue to think that time belongs only to the inner sense and that the imagination can schematize merely this inner time, in that case the I would be first closed in itself, something that was rejected by the “Refutation”, according to which this inner time of my (inner) representations, of my empirical existence, is determined by the persistent, i.e. by the temporal order of outer objects.

Finally, it wouldn't be transcendentally right to simply say, as Kant does in the transcendental Aesthetic, that space is only the form of the outer sense and time only of the inner sense. Instead, both are forms present in both senses in their own way and order, but both in objective connection to each other. Below I will support all these statements, strange as they may appear for the usual elucidation of Kantian doctrine, not only with regard to the “Refutation” and its consequences, but implementing a thinking interpretation of the third Analogy of the experience, in order to clarify the transcendental position of our body in the theoretical field.

4. Two Senses and Two Connected Temporalities

The first two types of categories, quantity and quality, their schemata and their principles (Axioms of intuition and Anticipations of perception) carry out a specific homogeneous composition in the form and matter of the sensible manifold and they work through thinking the intuition of every appearance. However, the last two types of categories, relation and modality, their schemata and principles, synthesize different and heterogeneous elements which are nonetheless necessarily connected to each other; these categories allow for both their diversity and their synthetic unity, and they show it. The categories of relation bring forth the distinction and the connection between the appearances themselves. Thanks to the first category we distinguish and combine what persists (substance) and what changes (accident) - the wall remains but its color is different now, after painting. By causality, this change should be ordered objectively (after painting), by seeking an empirical dependence of an appearance from another. «Community is the causality of a substance in the reciprocal determination of others» (B 111). It is only in this physically dynamic way, that we are able to detect the objective position of every appearance in space and in time. The categories of modality, for their part,
don’t represent the transcendental difference and the connection between the appearances, but between the cognizant transcendental subject and the object as such – as it was already explained.

The “Refutation” is placed now by Kant in the elucidation of the second Postulate of empirical thinking, since there is where the actuality (Wirklichkeit, the second category of modality) of the outer world is discussed. However, in this “Refutation” are really differentiated and related not the cognizant transcendental subject and the object in general (modality), but the inner and the outer sense, that is two appearances (relation), or rather two types of appearances; it provides proof, against Descartes and his followers, that the outer experience is as certain and as objective as the inner experience, since the temporal determination of the latter depends on the former. That is why the “Refutation” actually belongs to the Analogies of experience. In fact, in its argument the schema of the first category of relation - persistence against change - is used, and consequently it could be thought the best things is to assign it a place in the first Analogy. But that would be wrong. In the first Analogy any distinction and connection of both senses cannot take place, inter alia because a relation between substance and accident exists in the outer appearances themselves, but not in the inner and is not the relation between the inner and the outer sense, as an inner appearance cannot be taken as an accident of an outer, as they are different kind of appearances: empirical subjective and empirical objective.

An initial distinction between them appears first in the second Analogy as a difference between the subjective succession of the representations in the apprehension and the objective succession of the appearances due to the rule of the dependency or causality (A 193-195/B 238-240). Here, however, the persistence is not taken into account, either the connection between the two senses and the two kind of appearances, therefore there is still no complete distinction between them. The simultaneity of the empirical substances and simultaneity between them and the dependent inner representations are still missing. This could only be added in the third category of relation, in the community or interaction as «special actus of the understanding» (B 111), as well as in the corresponding third Analogy, in which the elements of the two first categories of relation are brought together into play; in this way they gain their utter determination, and its extent, its volume and its entire sphere as nature is given to the empirical experience (A 216/B 263). The persistent, which makes the determination of the changes possible, must really be sought in the simultaneous things. And vice versa, the simultaneity of objects is not conceivable without many persistent things. It is only the third Analogy that establishes accurately and objectively that which persists and which changes, that which occurs simultaneously, comes earlier or later in the outer and in the inner appearances because it is only really there determined the objective distinction and connection between both senses, which belong to one experience, and so the objective position of my existence in the space and time of the outer appearances, as it was required in the “Refutation”. This piece should have been treated here, in the third Analogy.

The following example can serve as explanation. I visit a palace. I visit one room after another, I pay attention first to one thing or part of it and then to something else, and so on. But all the time I distinguish between the temporality of the objects and the time of my inner
representations of these objects, I differentiate the subjective succession of my apprehension of the whole palace from the simultaneity and persistence of its rooms and their contents, but at the same time I connect both kinds of appearances, the outer objects and my inner representations; only in this way I can objectively determine the palace, cognize it and orientate myself in it. «In what recognize I the simultaneity of the things when in fact our representations in the apprehension follow one another?», wonders Kant in a Reflection of the nineties. «In what that we can apprehend there [in the outer world] the manifold forwards and backwards. But because in the inner sense all is successive, so nothing can be taken backwards, therefore the reason of the possibility of the latter [the possibility of going backwards and visiting again the already seen rooms of the palace] must be in something outside ourselves. Here, all three Analogies are involved, which can only happen in the third. So we distinguish between two processes or empirical order of time which must have always been connected to each other: the time of the inner sense, the time of the subjective and individual appearances, and the time of the outer objects of the world which, in contrast with the first, is objective. Thanks to this opposition we understand both as such, as subjective and objective respectively, but both forming one experience, since, as the “Refutation of idealism” shows, the empirical determination of the inner sense depends of the outer; that is why both are objective appearances albeit in their own order, or rather objective-subjective experiences, because otherwise a comparison between them would be impossible. Indeed, I have these particular inner representations and not others, because I am paying attention on this object or on this part of the palace, and anyone who takes my place, will also have these inner representations (here again emerges the intersubjective - a priori, universal - element of the objective cognition) that could be in that way differentiated from the hallucinations and from the dreamed (the latter in turn also have to be differentiated from each other) and so recognized as such, as an objective inner representation.

However, we cannot realize all of this if time were only the form of the inner sense and not of both, in a different but related order. We cannot assume that there would be time as a form of inner experience first and then it would become mediate and thereby a form of outer experience and their persistent objects, only when the outer objects become inner representations. In that case, there would be merely one temporal order: the succession of the representations and thus a distinction between two types of temporalities would be impossible. We cannot assume this because just the opposite was proved in the “Refutation” and indeed that the temporality of the outer experience, i.e. the persistence of the external objects, makes the temporal determination of the inner sense possible. Time as form of the sensibility must be therefore the condition of possibility for these two temporalities; the inner and the outer, the aesthetic spatiality and temporality are indeterminate, therefore all determinations come from the synthetic spontaneity. The split into two senses, that is, the distinction between the inner representations as such and the outer objects, must occur but this will be discussed later; it happens neither in the transcendental Aesthetic, nor in the Analytic of concepts, nor in the Schematism, nor in the Axioms of intuition, nor in the Anticipations, because all of these topics can be understood without the distinction of two senses. The place for this difference is the third Analogy. Here this difference as a transcendental element of objective cognition should first enter as the distinction between a subjective order of the temporality of the inner
representations and as an objective of the objects of the world. These elements are differentiated and objectively connected as component of one and the same experience.

However, to explain this separation and connection, it is necessary to add and to consider space, which is already mentioned in the formulation of the third Analogy: «All substances, insofar as they can be perceived in space as simultaneous, are in thoroughgoing interaction» (B 256). Here we find again two kinds of spatiality, an objective and a subjective one, and in this way we can attempt to introduce the concept of body into the KrV.

5. The body as the spatiality of the subject

I order the appearances of the world as objective persistent or changing, as constant or successive, as simultaneous or as one behind the other, thanks to their dynamic and reciprocal relations, because the absolute time cannot be perceived. I understand this order as objective by differentiating the objectively running time of the world (outer sense) from the subjective-objective succession of my inner representations (inner sense). This has been elucidated. Now we can assume that something similar happens with space. I cognize the objects as already spatial through the Axioms and Anticipations, as well as by the elements or actions that make them both possible: sensibility, imagination, categories and apperception. But I order the appearances themselves in an objective space and determine the place of each only through their reciprocity; this happens thanks to their dynamic relations that they maintain each other and thanks to the Analogies of experience, because the absolute space cannot be intuited. In order for objects to exist simultaneously, they must be located in different places and be in a dynamic community with each other, which enables them to determine their position in space and in time reciprocally. Here again I may also add, although without the support of the CPR, that we understand this objective order of the appearances in space as such, because we are ourselves a particular spatial object in interaction with the others for the outer sense and identify ourselves with it internally in the inner sense, in the feeling and in the actions; if I was not really in the world, I could neither cognize it nor act on it. This outer-inner appearance is the empirical subject, who must also be in interaction with the empirical objects in order to become an appearance. That is the body as a necessary transcendental element for the objective cognition. This is my thesis.

Back to our example. I visit a palace and I can order its rooms and its parts and itself spatially and temporally in relation with the other objects of the world, because I am, as an empirical subject, spatial and temporal too and therefore I can visit it and be in real interaction with it. I can cognize the objects of the world and orientate myself in their space and time starting from a point of the world, where I am. I orientate myself in the areas of space, Kant wrote in 1768, thanks to the corporal feeling of my body that makes me able to distinguish between right and left, front and rear, down and up. I am this body, with which I identify myself, that objectifies me in one object and put me in a real connection to the world, but at the same time I have this objective body that I cognize also through its dynamic interaction with other objects, and that I use as a means for my subjective and ideal purposes. The pre-critical
Kant had already written in his *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* (1766): «The one body, whose alterations are *my* alterations, this body is *my* body, and the place of it is at the same time *my* place» (AA 2: 324). In a Reflection from the earlier nineties, in which Kant again thought about the “Refutation of idealism”, it is said more clearly: in order to differentiate between imagination and perception of external objects, and to take them as something actually exterior, «we are ourselves before objects of the outer sense, because otherwise we wouldn’t perceive our place in the world and we couldn’t intuit us in interaction with the other things. That is why the soul as an object of the inner sense cannot perceive its place in the body, but it is in the place where the human being is […] I am even an object of my outer intuition in the space, and without that I couldn’t cognize my position in the world. Therefore, the soul cannot cognize its place in the body, because it would have to perceive itself through the outer sense as outside of itself».

The subject must appear also spatially as empirical subject, just so that it can determine its existence, as it was intended in the “Refutation”, because that can only occur in objective interaction with the outer world. The third Analogy of experience completely determines what persists, what changes and what is simultaneous in the appearances, also the objective order of space and time and the place of all objects of the nature. In this objective time and space I (the subject) should find my place and my moment in order to determine my existence and the time of the representations of my inner sense, as required by the “Refutation” and by the objective cognition, and this should be done in dynamic relation with the outer objects; otherwise I could neither orientate myself nor cognize the world. I also have to relate my existence and my inner representations to some persistent things in the space, that is, to put myself in interaction with them. But I only can do that if I am something different and simultaneous to them, therefore if I am in a different place, and if I am spatial too, or rather if I identify myself with a body that is both object of outer intuition (in interaction with the other bodies) and object of inner sense, where it is felt as *my* body. This body is the spatiality of the subject. We must therefore transcendentally think that the inner sense (the “soul” in Kantian meaning) has its own kind of spatiality, and space, not only time, belongs to its form (I *feel* my body and its spatiality) as a necessary transcendental element of the objective cognition. Both kinds of spatiality (and temporality), that of the outer and of the inner sense, are modulations of space (and time) as forms of entire sensibility, which are shaped by the imagination according to its schemata and syntheses.

I consider the objective space and time from the place and moment of my felt body, with which I identify myself, because I determine its place and moment in relation with the objective space and time, through its interactions with the other appearances, and so I say for example: “I am now and in this hour of the night in my room”. Through the space and time of outer appearances and in interaction with them I can determine my empirical existence and cognize what I am as appearance. This place and this moment are the starting point of my empirical perspective on the world. This perspective, my inner sense or empirical consciousness has these perceptions and representations due to the outer objects, that is, according to the objective position of my spatial and temporal body and because I now pay attention to these things and not to others. In that way and to this extent they condition, limit and determine (Kant says “affizieren”, affect) my inner representations and my existence, as it was intended.
in the argument of the “Refutation”. Nevertheless, my inner sense cannot be understood as a mere effect of the outer object; the causality is the relation between external appearances, but not between both senses. The inner sense, like the whole consciousness, is found in the own spontaneity of the apperception, conditioned through an ideal auto-affection, that is empirically understood as attention, and connected with the outer sense by the apperception of both and its objective-subjective body.

I move through the palace. My objective successive representations of the inner sense are conditioned by the outer things that are now before my body or next to it, but also by the attention I pay to some of them, which determine that I have a representation of them and not of others, which therefore go unnoticed. This ideal spontaneity and auto-affection in the inner sense have a sphere limited to a concrete part of the material world because of the limitation of my body, a sphere that changes with my corporal movement (for instance, through the palace) and through the spatial and temporal alteration of the outer objects. I recognize the inner representations as subjective, because they are conditioned by the ideal action of my attention and by the objective individual position of my body in the spatial and temporal order of the outer things, where I place myself. Therefore, it is not only the inner sense and representation that configure my empirical existence, but also the spatial and temporal felt body. Thus the subject appears as an empirical individual.

I perceive the objective world from my spatial and temporal perspective according to the particular position of my body, and this perspective changes with the movements of it. Furthermore, my perception is objective in the case of where other cognizing beings see or hear or feel in the same way or have similar inner representations when they are in the same position or place. When I watch the sky and believe I see something, but no-one besides me sees it as well, it would be a non-objective perception which has no external actuality. Thanks this distinction we understand both, one as an objective inner representation and the other as non-objective\textsuperscript{31}. The two criteria for the objectivity of a perception are only to fall in line with the empirical laws according to the Analogies of experience and to be in conformity with the other thinking subjects according to their felt bodies and perceptions. This plurality of the subjective bodies also serves to grasp my inner sense as mine and to understand me as empirical individual, since my empirical perspective depends on the particular position of my body: from my place or moment I can see something that others cannot. The plurality of the subjective bodies is therefore also a necessary element for explaining the cognition in the third Analogy. There is a transcendental need for several subjects and for each of them to have their own felt body, different from the other in the objective space and time, but also in community and interaction. The community of corporal subjects is an equally necessary element for the objective cognition that makes a generally valid point of view possible. The transcendental I is the basis for individuals as well as for the community of the cognizing beings. As action, the I is individual and everyone should think for oneself - “that is the motto if enlightenment” (AA 8: 35). But its forms must be generally valid for all human beings, otherwise they are not objective. Here this is also the case; the community is needed in order to distinguish the objective inner representations from the illusions, hallucinations and dreams.
Now the question is no longer about the community of the soul with other known but different substances outside us, but merely about the conjunction of representations in inner sense with the modifications of our outer sensibility, and how these may be conjoined with one another according to constant laws, so that they are connected into one experience (A 385-386).

The question is rather, «how is outer intuition – namely, that of space (the filling of it, shape and motion) – possible at all in a thinking subject. But it is not possible for any human being to find an answer to this question, and no one will ever fill this gap in our knowledge, but rather only indicate it, by ascribing outer appearances to a transcendental object that is the cause of this species of representations, with which cause, however, we have no acquaintance at all, nor will we ever get a concept of it» (A 393). The issue shifts to the limits of cognition, to the final border of the phenomena. The question about the relation between the two senses no longer arises, but it does so regarding the origin of the knowledge as such, which seems to have two last responsible elements: the “I think” or transcendental subject and the transcendental object or the think-in-itself, which affects us. Can the outer intuition be explained by the affection of the transcendental subject by a transcendental thing? Here the body should also play its role.

We have also seen in our example of visiting a palace that the time, space and content (sensation) of my objective inner sense (not of my hallucinations or dreamed) are conditioned and determined by the time, space and content of the outer things. But we understand the determination and the conditionality under the appearances by means of the categories of relation, by means of the causality, thanks to which we objectify all dependency. Therefore, we say: the outer things affect us. But in that way we regard and consider our sensibility, our passivity, from an empirical (no transcendental) or objective point of view, as an effect of an appearance on another. The things can trigger only an objective effect on us, they cannot give us sensations, which are a kind of consciousness (if giving consciousness were possible at all), because they don’t have it (either a supposed transcendental object or thing-in-itself). They cannot have a direct effect on our senses either, only on our felt body, which is objective (like the affecting things) as well as subjective, as the subject is identified with such a body. The affection of the objects on the mind have two moments, the objective and the subjective, and our body serves as synthetic combination. The objective side of this affection is placed by Kant at the beginning of the Critique, at the commencement of the transcendental Aesthetic, but it truly belongs to the Analogies of experience, where the objective relation and dependence between the appearances are discussed. This objective affection can be explained and understood only empirically, and to move it outside this area goes against the transcendental way of thinking and produces contradictions, because we confuse different ways of being and engender a métâbasis eis állo génos.

Therefore, the transcendental thinking cannot consider it as the first step of the perception, as the subjective original opening of the I to the world, as the transcendental foundation of the whole sphere of objective cognition, as the first transcendental limitation which allows the sensibility, the reception of the world and the identification with our body.
On the contrary, the objective affection is a piece to be situated in the middle of the system of transcendental thinking, which is explained in the Analogies of experience. The first transcendental limitation should be subjective, which cannot be elucidated as an effect of a thing, neither of a thing-appearance nor of a thing-in-itself. This should be understood as auto-limitation of the transcendental subject itself, as a real and ideal limitation. The real one, the last or supreme limitation of the real and free subject, was thought by Kant as a categorical imperative and moral action, but that was not placed in relation to the objective cognition and it remains in the *Critique of pure reason* not-thought, obstructed by the pre-critical paradigm of the objective affection. Instead, the first transcendental and ideal auto-limitation of the subject was brilliantly proposed in his doctrine about space and time. They, as a priori forms of the sensibility, make this receptivity possible because they are the first acceptance that there are things outside of me, before and after me, that is, they are the first ideal and transcendental auto-limitation, that opens the subject to the world.

**Abstract:** The body of the subject should be considered as a transcendental element for all objective cognition and must play an essential role in the third Analogy of experience. For that it is necessary to understand that both the outer and inner appearances have their own specific spatiality and temporality. The starting point is the Kantian reflections in his *‘Refutation of Idealism’* and its consequences.

**Keywords:** Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, body, sense, space, time, Refutation of Idealism, Analogies of experience.

**Notes**

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2 The first version of this article was edited under the title “Versuch, den Begriff des eigenen Körpers in die *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* einzuführen” in the book *Das Leben der Vernunft. Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlín, 2013, pp. 109-130.

3 CPR B 69/B 153-157; A 385f.


6 MS, VI, 237, 254.

7 In the *cogito*, Descartes doesn’t distinguish between the pure Apperception and the inner sense, but both are accepted as directly certain.

8 «Now all outer appearances are of this kind: their existence cannot be immediately perceived, but can be inferred only as the cause of given perceptions» (A 367).

9 See CPR B 276-277.

10 CPR, B XII ff.

11 «Reality is in the pure concept of the understanding that to which a sensation in general corresponds, that, therefore, the concept to which in itself indicates a being (in time)» (A 143/B 182).
12 See my article “Heidegger and Kant’s Refutation of Idealism”, in Objectivity after Kant. Its Meaning, its Limitations, its Fateful Omissions, Olms, Hildesheim, 2013, pp. 249-278.

13 «Change of the inner sense or inner experience is admitted by the idealist too, and if you want to refute him therefore, so this cannot happen otherwise than that you show him, this inner experience or, which is the same, empirical consciousness about my existence presupposes outer perception» (Refl. 6311, AA 18: 610).

14 In B 224, the reference to the change disappears, and so the formulation of this analogy is incomplete, because the categories of relation and the analogies of experience form a dynamic physical connection (nexus) between two disparate appearances, which are related each other, such as substance and accident, or cause and effect (B 201-202 note). But the reference to the change is made in the proof (B 225).

15 «Change requires and presuppose some persistent, in which they happen and which makes that the change is perceived. […] We selves cannot be this persistent […] That is why the possibility of the inner experience presupposes the reality of outer sense» (Refl. 6311, AA 18: 611). Every appearance persists only relatively, i.e. in comparison to others that change faster.

16 In the first Analogy of experience Kant had still said: «Alteration is a way of existing that succeeds another way of existing of the very same object. Hence everything that is altered is lasting, and only its state changes. […] only what persists (the substance) is altered, while that which is changeable does not suffer any alteration but rather a change, since some determinations cease and other begin» (A 187/B 230-231).

17 The schema is «a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image» (A 140/B 179-180).

18 CPR A 33/B 50; A 102; B 137-138, 154-156, 292.

19 I am assuming that the word "or" cannot mean, time would be only for certain appearances, because this interpretation of the expression would go against the Kant’s doctrine and against his own words in the transcendental Aesthetic and in chapter of Schematism. The same could happen with the space.


21 «[…] only in what is simultaneous must be the persistent», says the Reflection 6312 from the beginning of the nineties (AA 18: 612). Every appearance persists only relatively, in comparison to others that change faster.

22 Reflection 6313, AA 18: 614.

23 Kant uses the example of the "apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house» (A 190/B 235; also A 192-193/B 237-238), and in the elucidation of the second Analogy. In my opinion the temporality of the house and the simultaneity of its parts can only be completely understood in the third Analogy.

24 Reflection 6312, AA 28: 612. See also Reflection 6313 and 6314, AA 28: 614 and 616. See also CPR B 256-258 and A 211/B 258.

25 CPR A 68-69/B 93-4; A 77-79/B 103-105; B 129-131.

26 The philosophical reflection by Hume starts from this separation and distinction. He puts himself behind closed-doors in the inner sense, and cannot see the transcendental action that makes the separation that he himself does. He therefore doesn’t find neither the outer object as appearances (he thinks it as philosophical thing-in-itself) nor the transcendental subject that makes all this possible, but only impressions and a bundle of perceptions.

27 B 225; A 183/B 226; B 233; A 200/B 235; B 257.

28 Empirical is the concrete body I have, but transcendental is the necessity for the subject to have in general a felt body, without which there is not cognition. It is the same as in the case of causality: empirical is this concrete cause, and transcendental is the necessity to find the cause of an appearance.


30 Reflection 6315, AA 28: 619-620. See also “Über das Organ der Seele” (AA 12: 35).

31 «The only general characteristic of the madness is the loss of the common sense (sensus communis) and the incoming of the opposite logical private sense (sensus privatus). For instance, a person sees in broad daylight on his desk a burning light that another next to him doesn’t see, or he hears a voice that no one else hears» (Kant, Anthropology § 53, AA 7: 219). With these two elements, the objective and non-objective perception, the content of the inner sense isn’t yet exhausted. In addition, there are also feelings, dreams, fantasies, imaginary thoughts, sentiments, emotions, passions, etc. All these make their own contribution to the knowledge.

Some indications about how this identification is possible can be obtained in the Critique of teleological judgment. Read about this question my book *Kant: la "Crítica del Juicio teleológico y la corporalidad del sujeto* (UNED, Madrid, 2002).