The notion of death as a knowledge and research object in developmental psychology

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Abstract

In the present work we analyse the theoretical attention that human sciences have given to practices regarding death in the search for a definition of what is specifically human. We revise fundamental lines of questioning and perspectives resultant of considering death as a cognitive object. Following this line, we present the general characteristics of several studies in the field of developmental psychology, amongst which we include our own theoretical affiliation regarding the child’s comprehension of death. This perspective is developed within the theoretical framework of Piagetian genetic psychology coordinated with Moscovici’s social representations theory, in an attempt to overcome classic dichotomies and to avoid disregarding the specificity of the production of ideas in particular sociocultural contexts.

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Social sciences and the phenomenon of death

Sciences studying human beings have defined their knowledge objects by progressively specifying their irreducibility to other explanatory fields. Linguistics, anthropology, sociology and psychology have shown that laws and processes characterizing language, culture, society or the psyche cannot be reduced and simplified to the principles derived from research on natural objects. This appears to be true regardless of any ontological assumptions on the ultimate nature of stuff, given that, even in monist perspectives, the recognition of different levels of phenomena and, hence, of problems and principles, is possible. Nowadays, reductionist perspectives tend to be considered as theoretical impoverishments and not synthetic solutions tending to eliminate an allegedly unnecessary redundancy. This is mainly because methodological and theoretical extrapolations eliminate the objects and their relations, restricting the real to the boundaries imposed by the theoretical perspective assumed, turning the phenomena unobservable as such (OVERTON, 2004, 2006; VALSINER, 1998, 2006, among others). This does not mean that the search for intra and inter-theoretical coherence must be abandoned, under the pretext of an incommensurability turning each theory into a fief. Intellectual efforts destined to look for compatibility between different hypotheses avoid reductionism at the same time as they strengthen the specificity of theories (see, for example, CASTORINA; BAQUERO, 2005; PSALTIS; DUVEEN; PERRET-CLERMONT, 2009). This way, metatheoretical analysis redefines the boundaries of theories, in a symmetrical process of conceptual differentiation and integration.

The nature-culture antinomy represents a recurring tension that, in different moments of scientific contemporary knowledge, adopted multiple denominations and has been the centre of uncountable reductionisms. The definition of what is specifically human can be presented by highlighting one of the two poles in tension, or in the middle-ground in which they connect. This is how the homo loquax, sapiens or faber, have been identified, as a paradigm of the rupture with nature and the emergence of a new order inaugurated by Man. Strictly speaking, these characterizations have tried to find the trace of what is specifically human, the novelty which cannot be found in physical or biological nature. And even though there is no consensus on the existence of a unique distinctive and fundamental dimension, there is agreement regarding human
specificity defined by a set of diverse characteristics: language, the development of intelligence or work capacity, among others. The stress may be set on either one of them, while the pieces of this puzzle seem to be established.

Some of the attempts to overcome these classic dichotomies have aimed to highlight the dialectic interdependence of opposed terms. It is possible that in the years to come, the developments in psychology and neurology, for instance, may produce a theoretical interface which avoids the usual reductionisms and parallelisms. Notable exponents of contemporary thinking have worked in this direction. Levistraussean prohibition of incest or Piagetian constructivism redefined the division between nature and culture (LÉVI-STRAUSS, 1949, 1962) or between subject and object of knowledge (FERREIRO; GARCÍA, 1975; PIAGET, 1950, 1967), showing that there is a necessary relation between these levels that cannot be rift.

The questions regarding the specificity of the object lie under these theoretical perspectives: what is specifically human and what is not human? What differentiates us from other species? What is Man? What is a non-human nature?

Curiously, in this search for specificity and definitions, death has not been recognized enough as a passage point from one order to the other, that is, as the interface zone between nature and culture (MORIN, 1970). More precisely, how men deal with death seems to be as characteristic of human-nature as language and the use of material and symbolic tools. Rituals, ceremonies and beliefs are a part of the symbolic scheme humanizing a phenomenon which is, simultaneously, natural, as in biological and cultural. Not every human group developed written language; likewise, the representation or use of signs does not seem to be an exclusive property of man; intelligence, understood as a non-instinctive capacity for problem-resolution, is also found in some animal species. Nevertheless, there is no other known specie that can account for beliefs in any kind of post mortem existence. Death is an observable phenomenon for all cultures in all times (ARIÈS, 1975; THOMAS, 1975). All human groups, without exception, have dealt with the phenomenon of death, in religions, myths, legends or explanatory theories. Identity, for example, is a category that could be considered intuitively as transcultural and stable throughout the life of an individual, but these ideas have been
criticized by anthropological studies which showed the existence of cultures where the perception of self can be transformed in all of its dimensions, several times in the course of a lifetime (COOLEY, 1902; GOFFMAN, 1959, 1961; MEAD, 1934). Thus, death is much more than the perception of our own existence, it seems to be a transcultural observable that acquires universality, proper to facts of nature, and, at the same time, relativity that distinguishes cultural facts. To assume its universality as well as its particularity leads us to the paradox which defines it as an object of knowledge (TAU; LENZI, 2009).

Evidently, it is possible to consider many aspects related to death and its psychological and social processing. Anthropology, for example, has contributed to reveal the particular way in which culture organizes its meanings, surrounding practices and beliefs, and even how these meanings surrounding the phenomenon of death, have varied historically (ARIÈS, 1975, 1977; MORIN, 1970; THOMAS, 1975). The classic typology of Ariès (1975) on the attitudes towards death shows the way in which the study of different rituals, world views and occidental institutions, can allow identifying the social representations in which they are based (CERIANI CERNADAS, 2001; MOSCOVICI, 1961). In terms of Moscovici, social representations are “implicit theories” on the social world (JODELET, 1984), ways to interpret, think and know the daily reality:

[...] a system of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function; first to establish an order which will enable individuals to orient themselves in their material and social world and to master it; and secondly to enable communication to take place among the members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their World and their individual and group history. (MOSCOVICI, 1973, p. xiii).

Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that the reality of these social representations is not that of ideas or some form of platonic entity. Their ontological statute is that of every-day social actions. Thus, the different social representations are inscribed in social interchanges, rituals and institutions, which makes them as mutable as the practices in which they express themselves. Different praxis and institutionalized representations of death have been described, from the “domesticated death” in the
Middle-Ages, marked by a familiarity with the daily experience with the dying; to the current “forbidden death”, in which the loneliness of privatization, medicalization and clandestinity of death are the effect of a modern discretion tending to reduce grief and mourning.

From a different perspective, psychoanalysis has extendedly studied the psychological processes which take part in normal and pathological mourning facing a loss, as well as the emotional constellations which surround the conscience of the finiteness of life (some remarkable classic works are those of AULAGNIER, 1968; FREUD, 1920, 1923; KLEIN, 1932, among many others). In the line of “palliative cares” there has also been a group of clinical research –eclectic, as a matter of fact– tending to study and treat patients reactions to terminal diseases, the death of family members or close relatives (see, for example: BIANK; WERNER-LIN, 2011; BLACK; URBANOWICZ, 1987; COHEN; MANNARINO ; DEBLINGER, 2006; HIGGINS, 1999; KÜBLER-ROSS, 1971; MARKUSEN; FULTON, 1971; PETTLE, 1998; RODRIGUES de LIMA; KOVÁCS, 2011; WILLIS, 2001). There are, thus, theoretical developments that consider death, the core of social practices, emotional and psychopathological phenomena.

Next, I will focus in the presentation of certain sets of problems which are found throughout developmental psychology when studying the phenomenon of death as a knowledge object, and, in particular, when studying it in child development.

**Death as a knowledge object: research in the field of developmental psychology**

Now, what do we know about death as a knowledge object? What do subjects think about death? Do individual ideas on finitude have a social origin? Is it possible to study subjective ideas about death without confusing them with cultural manifestations? A possible answer to these questions, points towards cultural and historically instituted practices, and to recognize in them, a set of thoughts and beliefs about death. In that case, though, we would not be making a psychology of death, but an anthropology or history of death. This can also be said of any object of knowledge: even though there is a historic-anthropological dimension that has a social and contextual value and meaning, the problem regarding psychological mechanisms and pro-
cesses explaining the subjective appearance of certain ideas, thoughts or systems of ideas, remains. If we accept that the phenomenon of death configures a social object of knowledge by antonomasia—given it has the properties of all social objects and is, at the same time, unavoidable for any human group—it is expected for psychology to have studied ideas, beliefs and representations on death. What do we know about the spontaneous knowledge subjects build regarding the end of life? When does knowledge on death appear? Does the notion of death develop gradually until attaining some stable adult level? What are the ideas children have about death? When do they appear? How do social presentations of the group participate in the knowledge subjects have regarding this object?

In spite of the central place death occupies among human facts, comparatively, it is very little what has been studied regarding what subjects know, imagine or think of this matter, and the transformations this knowledge shows throughout human development. For this reason, we would like to point out this notable vacancy in cognitive developmental psychology, and, at the same time, present the line of research we have been developing, oriented by some of the problems and questions mentioned in the previous paragraph (*).

It is difficult to indicate an absolute start date for a research tradition on a certain topic because the questions orienting it, as the shoots of a plant, could not grow other than from pre-existing ramifications. With certain degree of injustice, then, it is possible to recognize a fundamental milestone in the studies on child development regarding the comprehension of death. The publishing of Schilder and Wechsler, “The attitudes of children toward death” (1934), presented one of the investigations which systematically explored, for the first time in the field of psychology, ideas regarding death, in children from 5 to 15 years old. More than in the answers presented in this work, we are interested in the adopted methodological perspective. One of the exploratory strategies employed consisted in an individual interview where each child was asked to look at a porcelain doll sitting on a table. The interviewer pushed the doll with his finger, causing a more or less noisy fall on the table. Then, the doll would be seated again and the fall was repeated, without saying anything. With these repetitions, it was expected that the children would express “you have knocked her over”, “you have
killed her”, “she is dead”, or similar phrases. If this did not occur, the children were explicitly asked “what has happened?” in an attempt to approach the spontaneous ideas of children on death and their relation with a violent act. The originality of this design lays in the possibility of interrogating a young child without recurring to closed questions from questionnaires or assignments used in tests for adults (something used, for example, by these same authors, with older children, or by COTTON and RANGE in their exploration of 1990, where they used the FSSC scales of SCHERER and NAKAMURA, 1968; the HSC, of KAZDIN et al., 1983; and QEHAD, of SMILANSKY, 1987). Without doubt, it is possible to formulate many critiques to this methodological choice, but it does not seem simple to propose alternatives for a rigorous study of the ideas children have about death. In this field, along the usual difficulties found in every research in child psychology, there is also that of a subject source of anguish, inhibitions and social veils.

In this line of research, authors such as Anthony (1939, 1940), stressed the developmental dimension of the notion of death, showing the differences among groups of interviewed children, differences which went from the utter incomprehension of the word “death” to knowledge characterized by a biologically precise definition. The search of different levels was reconfirmed by researches such as the one Nagy (1948) conducted, analysing the oral and written narratives of 378 children from 3 to 10 years old, in Budapest. The most relevant conclusions of this study were the following:

“(1) The child who is less than five years of age usually does not recognize death as an irreversible fact; in death he sees life. (2) Between the ages of five and nine, death is most often personified and thought of as a contingency. (3) Only at the age of nine and later does he begin to view death as a process which happens to us according to certain laws”. (NAGY, 1948, pp. 80-81).

The development found by Nagy introduced two central observations which oriented future research: the passage from the belief in reversibility to the irreversibility of death and the animist personification of death in younger children. This last observed aspect –the personification of death– is one the keys to resolve what we consider to be a frequently unattended issue: the relation between cognition and the social representations of the peer group. In fact, against all odds, studies inspired in
Nagy’s research conducted outside Hungary did not find the systematic personification of death shown by the children of Budapest. From our perspective, the most plausible hypothesis to explain this discrepancy seems to be to state the relation between children’s ideas on death and social representations in legends and traditions in Hungarian folklore, where anthropological images of death are of frequent appearance (KASTENBAUM, 2000).

More recently, a new orientation in this field showed that the comprehension of death consists in a gradual appropriation of sub-notions, integrated in the adult idea of death (BOLDUC, 1972; CHILDERS; WIMMER, 1971; ELKIND, 1977; KANE, 1979; SMILANSKY, 1987; among others). In this line, death is a complex notion where other sub-notions are implied, such as universality –all live beings die–, causality –death is always produced by a cause of which it is the effect– or irreversibility –it is not possible to live again once you are dead–. The progressive and sequenced acquisition of such notional components during childhood allows defining developmental levels, in which these sub-notions integrate until the “adult” perspective is attained. Oriented by this perspective, a variety of methodological exploration have been conducted to study the implied subcomponents in beliefs, ideas and representations of death (BONOTI; LEONDARI; MASTORA, 2013; GUY, 1993; MAHON; GOLDBERG; WASHINGTON, 1999; TAMM; GRANQVIST, 1995; YANG; CHEN, 2002, 2006; among others).

Many of the mentioned lines of research have been objected, due to the fact that their replications in other sociocultural contexts conducted to divergent results. According to our point of view, it is clear that groups’ social representations (in the sense established by MOSCOVICI, 1961) intervene in the way death is conceived –the study conducted by Nagy (1948) with children in Budapest enhances this hypothesis–. Thus, a variation of the systems of ideas on death is expected, as a function of the cultures to which subjects belong to. Nevertheless, there is certainly another issue, of a methodological nature, and that is the origin of the contradiction found in the results. The instrument selected to obtain the data modifies what is observable for a researcher; in the same way as findings are, ultimately, a product of the theoretical assumptions adopted –these being implicit or explicit–. Briefly speaking, it is possible to state that different researches have studied subjective knowledge of very different kinds. Under
the generic question on what a subject thinks or believes about death, many heterogeneous questions can coexist. Is it possible, then, to study ideas on death? Or are we before a vaporous object that confuses with social practices, knowledge and ideologies?

Individual knowledge objects are inscribed in nets of meaning and social practices, which cannot be ignored, even in studies focused in the individual level of knowledge. Social psychology in the 1970s rapidly encountered the obstacle resulting of ignoring the social context. This ignorance is characteristic of the models derived from the paradigm of information processing and it consists in the reduction of the context to a set of stimuli. In other words, it reedited the positivist dualism in the field of social psychology. Summarily, the critiques to these perspectives pre-announced the same objections presented later on in the field of cognitive developmental psychology: excessive rationalism –the subject as a “thinking machine”–, the focus in individual knowledge, the reduction of the social context to a stimulus to be processed, and an ignorance of the genesis (ÁLVARO; GARRIDO, 2007; GIL-LACRUZ, 2007). Moscovici’s social representations theory, which we referred to earlier, proposed a shift in the analysis unit that covers from individual cognitive processes to collective forms of knowledge. The redefinition that occurs with this new perspective is radical, as its aim is not to determine how an external social reality influences subjects’ representations, but to show how the latter are a part of that same social reality (JODELET, 1984). The Geneva school took into account Moscovici’s ideas in its search for understanding the role of society in the production of individual knowledge and beliefs. The first works of Doise, Deschamps and Mugny (1985) denounced the excessive focus in intrapsychological processes in developmental psychology. Simultaneously, they showed the relation between individual and collective activities, as well as the participation of a subject in different groups at the same time. In this way, a new perspective in the explanation of knowledge production was developed.

The understanding of human death implies the comprehension of the life-span’s biological processes, as well as the interiorization of the social practices that account for its corresponding representations. This is why, from the previously mentioned perspective, the consideration of instituted practices surrounding death is unavoidable. Religions constitute a body of explicit practices and representations regard-
ing the end of life, and that is why they become one of the privileged focuses of analysis to characterize the individual development of this particular knowledge. The interface between individual and social interaction levels is, as such, the area in which studies on this notion should focus on.

From the presented standpoint, a research tradition has been developed, regarding the development of social knowledge (DELVAL; KOHEN, 2012; LENZI; CASTORINA, 2000). We believe that, with this, the study of the different dimensions implied in the notion of death, becomes possible, both theoretically and methodologically.

Following this line, in our empirical study (**)--conducted in the city of La Plata, Argentina--we adopted the assumption of the existence of systems of ideas on death, characterizing a form of knowledge of early appearance in child development. Children of 4 or 5 years old often use some rudimentary notion of death in their games and narratives; this is why we thought it would be possible to study these notions in young children and their possible observable transformations in groups of older children. A nodal point of our research was exploring if the notion of death develops analogously to other notions or daily concepts; that is, in other words, if it responds to the same transformation mechanisms and develops through stages of increasing complexity. This is a primal question in developmental psychology. We also asked ourselves about the relation between what subjects conceive and the ideas and practices of the peer group, in an attempt to avoid classic dichotomies. With the purpose of exploring these sociocultural influences, we divided the samples of children and their respective parents into two different groups, according to their religious and non-religious beliefs, in order to analyse the differences between the two of them.

Nevertheless, the methodological problem regarding the access to the child’s point of view, and of what are his ideas on death, remains. From our point of view, the solution is not to be found in a direct interrogatory on what death is. The reason for this could be, on the one hand, since, as other authors have pointed out, it would be a useless method to apply in an interview with young children; and, on the other hand, because during childhood, the development of language and certain logi-
cal relations is not the same as in adults. Consequently, we decided to design an exploratory instrument which could be systematic, without being too far away from the subject’s original perspective, and directed towards the thematic focuses we wished to study. Inspired in Piagetian clinical research modality (CASTORINA; FERNÁNDEZ; LENZI, 1984; INHELDER; BOVET; SINCLAIR, 1974; PIAGET, 1926; VINH-BANG, 1966), we tested different designs of interviews which allowed us to ask about death without introducing the theme ourselves as an imposed content. The challenge consisted, thus, in the establishment of a strategy so that the child would introduce the subject by himself, in the interview –spontaneously, from his own perspective, although guided by our interventions– as well as his considerations on the end of life. After several reconsiderations, we found a way of access to the subject equally attenuated and productive for all age groups. We started the interview promoting a conversation regarding the children’s own pets or those of their acquaintances, to ask them further along the interview what happened to those they do not have anymore or, if those they have now or know will always be with them. Precisely, pets are close enough to human beings to allow the personification of almost all human functions, and distant enough to avoid any form of inhibitory identification.

In sum, we defined a semi-structured interview –which allowed us to follow the dialectic of the clinical critical exploration–, with key questions to explore the ideas of 60 children from 5 to 10 years old; we also defined a sample we divided into two sub-groups: members of religious families –mostly catholic– and members of agnostic or atheist families. We, then, designed an instrument destined to the questioning of the 60 children’s parents regarding their daily practices and the child’s experiences with the death of close relatives or pets. Our fundamental hypothesis that sustained the decision to also interview the parents is that child knowledge is modulated by the social representations of the peer group. We admit, thus, that individual knowledge is inserted in a net of contextual meanings in a dialectical relation. Summarizing, according to Jodelet (2002), the study of the social representations of a social group is the “via to understanding the place of subjects’ inscription in a social order and historicity, and account for the construction (...) of the interpretations they produce within a culture” (JODELET, 2002, p. 129, our translation). This is why we explored family beliefs and
the type of explanations that the parents had given or would give to the child if they had to explain a close death. The subsequent analysis of our data was oriented, not only to determine the levels of the understanding of death in children, but also to find the relations between family answers and the children’s systems of original ideas.

At this point, and without going into procedural details of the research, we would like to present an issue on the subject from which we started. The data obtained seem to lead us, once again, to the tension mentioned between old dichotomies in the history of psychology. The ideas on death in each child have a certain degree of originality that makes them unique. Simultaneously, they account for beliefs which are strongly ideological and a part of the social representations of the peer group. In this intersection we find originality and reproduction, making death a complex knowledge object (LENZI; TAU, 2011).

As an example, we will just present one of the children’s most extended and recurring spontaneous idea in our sample, as well as the most variable in each case. We are referring to what we could call the persistence of life post mortem. We identify, in this way, all the conceptualizations on death in terms of the persistence of some form of activity, of a “new life”, or the partial suspension of vital manifestations, as opposed to an absolute retention or elimination of dead people’s actions. Children from religious families tend to argue, in a more or less sophisticated manner, that the dead still exist in heaven, hell or in some other place. On the one hand, we find beliefs in “the soul”, “the ghost” or “the spirit”, defined ambiguously as what is “inside” the body, and that, when a person dies, it comes out of it and goes to “heaven” or “with God”, “floating” or “flying”. Here, “heaven” is always a concept equivalent to daily experience: the space where we observe the stars or celestial bodies. On the other hand, some children refer, more or less sophisticatedly, to what “goes to heaven” as simply “the person”. To justify this change of localization post mortem, they build truly original ideas—as opposed to the ideas which can be identified as coming from religious, family representations or representations coming from fictional imaginary and popular narratives—and the difference between the age groups lays in the degree of coherence found in the presented arguments. This means that the older subjects can recognize and compensate the logical problems resulting of the simultaneous acceptance of the
burial of the body and the rise to heaven. Precisely, it would seem that the contradictions that can arise from these initially atomized ideas are what forces children to introduce explanatory hypotheses, integrating systems of ideas of different origins (LENZI; TAU, 2011).

Contrarily to what we had foreseen, children from agnostic or atheist families believe, mostly, in a post-mortem existence, generally displaced from the place where daily life takes place. A first look at the data would lead us to believe there is no difference between the distinguished family groups. Nevertheless, the argumentation found in each one is very different. While those belonging to one group find the evidence of the persistence of existence in the family group’s religious beliefs – heaven, hell, the souls –, the others also appeal to the social representations available in their group, amongst which we found those explaining the material conservation of energy or the ecological interactions between live beings – microorganisms’ digestion, transformation into new forms of material life, etc.–.

With regard to this, it is important to refer to the strong relation between some of the children’s beliefs and their parents’. All children from religious families accept, mostly and at all studied ages, the existence of heaven, the clouds or the stars as places towards which dead people – or at least a part of them, generally, the soul – go. Contrarily to this, only some children from atheist families appear convinced of the inexistence of the soul, heaven or any explanation referring to religious images. The explanation of this asymmetry may be that popular representations in tails, social media and daily language are strongly charged with representations about death. We also found that atheist parents explicitly referred or would refer to religious images when confronted with the necessity to explain a death to their children. This would be because they admit that it would be a less painful alternative. Nevertheless, both the belief in heaven as its denial, do not appear to develop with time. On the contrary, these representations characteristic of the group to which children belong to appear relatively unchangeable across the lifespan – something analogous to what happens with ideological aspects –, while other systems of beliefs do show transformations.
Thus, the found construction of new knowledge regarding the body, biological processes and causes for death, do not lead children to modify the nucleus of beliefs regarding transcendence. In other words, different rationalities appear to coexist: that of the ideological aspects which allows the reproduction and support the subject’s identity; and that of natural knowledge which shows a development oriented towards an increasing equilibrium. But in between these lines through which knowledge about death goes through, there is little search for coherence in between these two rationalities. The attempt to make these lines of ideas coherent is weak or limited to the construction of reasons which legitimize the disconnections or incommensurability of religious and biological ideas.

The designs that we just mentioned don’t consider the social context in terms of information or stimuli to be processed. The social practices in which children participate are part of the social reality that is to be known and, as such, part of the knowledge concerning society. It is within these practices, the domain of social knowledge is defined, and not outside or independently from them. All knowledge is social in its origin. But spontaneous knowledge on objects of the world of “human phenomena” refers to the same practices in which the subject participates (DELVAL; KOHEN, 2012). The social domain is thus defined as what refers to meaningful interactions in the peer group. Through a detour not observed in other domains, that knowledge is objectified and presents itself to the subject as existing “outside”, even if the relation always implies a double direction. To get to know the aspects instituted in a certain society is to participate of the practiced that allow us to represent the world in a certain manner. That is to say, broadly, that it is not the intra-psychological mechanism considered isolatedly which allow an accurate explanation of the construction of knowledge in this domain. According to this, studies on social knowledge should account for the social practices and representation in which this knowledge is inscribed.

As a preliminary conclusion

The notion of death presents itself, in our research, as a knowledge object in which ideological and conceptual aspects participate. This is why we believe that its study should consider the psychological processes involved, though always in the field
of social interactions and the particular sociocultural context in which they take place. Explaining how social representations participate in the production of individual knowledge is a challenge for research traditions founded in the dichotomy of “internal” and “external” processes, and the study of the comprehension of death confronts us with these theoretical and metatheoretical problems (see: CASTORINA; BARREIRO; CLEMENTE, 2005; CASTORINA, 2007, 2009; DUVEEN, 1997; EMLER; DICKINSON, 1993; MOSCOVICI; JOVCHELOVITCH; WAGONER, 2013). Future research will allow us to affirm, more precisely, if this intersection between cognition and social representations is the origin of a new field of studies, with its own specific principles and concepts, or if it is simply a redefinition and extension of a research program in developmental psychology.

Notes

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